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This Article explores the costs and benefits of criminal cooperation, the 
widespread practice by which prosecutors offer criminal defendants the 
opportunity to receive reduced sentences in exchange for their assistance 
in apprehending other criminals. On one hand, cooperation increases the 
likelihood that criminals will be detected and prosecuted successfully. This 
is the “Detection Effect” of cooperation, and it has long been cited as the 
policy‟s primary justification.  
On the other hand, cooperation also reduces the expected sanction for 
offenders who believe they can cooperate if caught. This is the “Sanction 
Effect” of cooperation, and it may grow substantially if the government 
enlists too many cooperators, enables them to be sentenced too 
generously, or causes them to become overly optimistic about their 
chances of receiving a cooperation agreement.  
When the government allows the Sanction Effect to grow too large, it 
undermines one of its key tools for improving deterrence. Indeed, when the 
Sanction Effect outweighs the Detection Effect, cooperation reduces 
deterrence, and the government unwittingly encourages more crime. Since 
cooperation is itself administratively costly, the policy perversely causes 
society to pay for additional crime.  
This Article reorients the cooperation debate around the fundamental 
question of whether cooperation deters wrongdoing. Drawing on 
economics and behavioral psychology, it provides a framework for better 
understanding how and when cooperation works. Government actors who 
laud and rely on cooperation must address the fundamental question of 
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whether it actually deters wrongdoing. To do otherwise is to leave society 
vulnerable to cooperation‟s greatest cost.  
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Cooperation is a pervasive component of criminal prosecutions.
1
 
Criminal defendants and their attorneys routinely offer information and 
assistance in the prosecution of other criminals in exchange for leniency at 
sentencing.
2
 Criminal laws that cover a broad range of conduct and long 
sentences that apply upon conviction have combined to create substantial 
incentives for criminal defendants to trade their assistance in exchange for 
leniency. Given cooperation‘s popularity as a criminal law enforcement 
tool,
3
 as well as its increasing importance in regulatory settings,
4
 this 




This analysis has implications not only for criminal law, where 
cooperation is most prevalent, but for other areas of government 
regulation, where public actors have steadily increased their reliance on 
the promise of leniency to induce the flow of information and assistance 
 
 
 1. ―[A] large part of the job of being a prosecutor is identifying and interviewing potential 
cooperating witnesses, evaluating their credibility, and then seeking corroboration for their version of 
events.‖ Steven M. Cohen, What is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
817, 817 (2002). Nationally, 13.5% of the defendants sentenced in the federal criminal justice system 
in 2008 were cooperators. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, at tbl.N (2008), http://ftp.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOC.htm [hereinafter 2008 
SOURCEBOOK]. However, in numerous judicial districts, the number of cooperating defendants was 
well above 20%. See id. at tbl.26. 
 2. ―‗Cooperation‘ is a term of art for the process by which a federal criminal defendant gains 
the possibility of sentence mitigation by providing assistance in the prosecution or investigation of 
others.‖ Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1 (1999). 
This Article addresses solely those forms of cooperation whereby the government pays the defendant 
through leniency at sentencing. It does not address those instances in which the government trades a 
reduced charge (―charge bargaining‖) or agrees to portray false facts to the court (―fact bargaining‖) in 
exchange for assistance in prosecuting others. For more on these two concepts, see Russell D. Covey, 
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1260–64 
(2008) (explaining the intractability of charge bargaining in federal practice), and Kate Stith, The Arc 
of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) 
(describing attempts to eliminate fact bargaining).  
 3. ―[I]n the view of Congress and the Sentencing Commission, assisting law enforcement is 
often critical to detecting and deterring crime, and punishing offenders.‖ United States v. Milo, 506 
F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2007).  
 4. See discussion infra Part I. 
 5. This Article focuses on cooperation by individual persons, and not corporate business 
entities. The deterrent value of cooperating with corporate entities has been well explored by Jennifer 
Arlen and Reinier Kraakman in Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability 
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (arguing for a regime that mitigates liability for a corporate 
entity that attempts to prevent and report crimes to the government), and by Jennifer Arlen in The 
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) 
(explaining that a strict vicarious liability regime perversely increases the probability of punishment 
for crimes that corporate entities detect but fail to deter).  














 Moreover, it moves the cooperation discussion forward 
in a more productive way. Currently, the proponents and detractors of 
cooperation talk past one another. Supporters argue that it benefits society 
by increasing the government‘s ability to detect and prosecute crime. 
Detractors contend that it is unfair to defendants (usually, those who have 
failed to secure an agreement) and provides the government with excess 
discretion and power. Cooperation‘s critics therefore seek procedural 
reforms, such as taping cooperating defendants‘ statements before they 
testify, or limiting prosecutors‘ discretion to choose or decline cooperation 
once a defendant has volunteered to assist the government. These reforms 
may make cooperation more costly (to the government) and more 
legitimate (in the eyes of noncooperating defendants), but they do nothing 
to help us address the core question of whether cooperation deters crime.  
Drawing on economics and, to a lesser extent, behavioral psychology, 
the Article examines cooperation‘s value by unpacking the motivations of 
the government agents who supply cooperation agreements and the 
defendants who demand them.
7
 The neoclassical theory of deterrence 
holds that the rational person refrains from engaging in wrongdoing when 
the expected costs of such wrongdoing—the sanction modified by the 
probability that it will be imposed—exceed its expected benefits.
8
 
Cooperation deters wrongdoing by increasing the government‘s ability to 
locate, identify, and prosecute those who flout the law.
9
 This is the 
―Detection Effect‖ of cooperation; by trading leniency for information and 
assistance, the government increases its ability to identify and prosecute 
wrongdoers, and by increasing the expected cost of criminal conduct, the 
government‘s use of cooperation arguably deters crimes. This is the 
 
 
 6. See discussion infra Part I. 
 7. ―Cooperation bargaining occurs when the defendant has information to trade, and the gain 
from bargaining includes this information, which could be used in other trials.‖ Eric Rasmusen, 
Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1541, 1552 (1998).  
 8. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
176–79 (1968). Individuals also may refrain from wrongdoing for reasons unrelated to formal 
sanctions. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: 
Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 865, 
866 (2008) (citing social science literature advancing legitimacy-based theories of legal compliance).  
 9. ―Indisputably, cooperators play a vital role in the Government‘s law enforcement efforts. 
Their assistance provides the Government with a powerful means to solve crimes and thereby to 
promote justice for the offenders, their victims and the larger society.‖ United States v. Losovsky, 571 
F. Supp. 2d 545, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For more detailed claims of cooperation‘s historical value in 
detecting and prosecuting organized crime, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The 
Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 













primary, if not exclusive, justification upon which cooperation‘s 
supporters often rely.  
Apart from the Detection Effect, however, cooperation provokes an 
entirely different response from potential wrongdoers: cooperation reduces 
the sanctions of those who successfully cooperate and receive leniency at 
sentencing. Accordingly, it encourages criminals to expect reduced 
penalties to the extent they believe they are likely to become cooperators 
and receive discounts for their valuable services. This is the ―Sanction 
Effect‖ of cooperation, and it has received little to no sustained analysis in 
the literature examining cooperation.  
The Sanction Effect competes with the Detection Effect; the former 
increases incentives to commit crimes, while the latter decreases them.
10
 
When the individual perceives a greater Detection Effect than Sanction 
Effect, the expected costs of his criminal conduct increase; if those 
expected costs exceed his expected benefits, he will be deterred.
11
 But 
what if the criminal perceives a stronger Sanction Effect than Detection 
Effect? In that case, the policy reduces deterrence.
12
 This is because the 
policy effectively reduces the expected cost of engaging in wrongdoing. 
Add to the mix cooperation‘s administrative and transactional costs, and 
we may have a policy whereby we literally pay for more crime.  
Cooperation thus is a complex process that places competing pressures 
on the costs and benefits of committing crime.
13
 Although traditional 
discussions of cooperation accept the premise that the Detection Effect 
overwhelms the Sanction Effect and then criticize cooperation‘s many 
collateral costs,
14
 their implicit assumption may not always be the case. 
 
 
 10. As discussed in Part III, infra, criminals may be more influenced by increases in the 
probability of detection than increases in sanctions. See generally Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of 
Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1507–08 (2008); John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of 
Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL‘Y 189, 193–95 
(2005).  
 11. Buell, Overbreadth, supra note 10, at 1508 (―The rational offender will choose not to violate 
the law if what she expects to gain from the violation is outweighed by her ex ante prediction of an ex 
post penalty and the chance it will be imposed, in addition to the amount of delay she expects to enjoy 
before its imposition.‖). 
 12. This argument assumes that criminals are deterred at least somewhat by the threat of law 
enforcement and sanctions. For more on this debate, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ANTHONY E. 
BOTTOMS, ELIZABETH BURNEY & P-O. WIKSTRÖM, CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE 
SEVERITY (Hart Publ‘g Ltd. 1999); Michael Tonry, Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence 
Research, in 37 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 279 (2008) (reviewing empirical 
literature).  
 13. Obviously, some will question whether criminal acts are the product of rational decision 
making. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral 
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 178–81 (2004).  
 14. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 2, at 1266 (declaring cooperation ―an essential tool of law 












Moreover, if the Sanction Effect exceeds the Detection Effect, our 
attempts to remedy this problem may upset other components of an 
already fragile sentencing ecosystem. For all of these reasons, future 
analyses of cooperation must question its overall effect on deterrence.  
This Article explores this problem in four parts. Part I lays out the 
backdrop for the Article‘s analysis. It briefly reviews the common 
criticisms of criminal cooperation and observes that despite these 
critiques, cooperation remains quite popular and may be migrating beyond 
its traditional criminal law context, most notably to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), whose Enforcement Division chief notably 
announced the Division‘s plan to ramp up investigations by relying on 
cooperators.
15
 Part I then goes on to explain why organizational 
cooperation, whereby corporations cooperate with regulatory authorities in 
order to reduce fines and avoid criminal indictments, is significantly 
different from individual cooperation, which is the core focus of this 
Article.  
The remainder of the Article then considers whether and when 
cooperation is most likely to deter or fail as a law enforcement tool. Using 
the federal criminal justice system as its case study,
16
 Part II starts by 
exploring the Detection Effect of cooperation on individual wrongdoers. 
Part II attempts to lay out the reasons why the Detection Effect exists and 
identifies those characteristics of cooperation (the government‘s inability 
to use information effectively, the possibility that defendants may lie, the 
potential for government abuse) that place a downward drag on the 
Detection Effect. 
Part III proceeds to consider the other side of cooperation, namely, the 
Sanction Effect. Presumably, any cooperation policy inherently reduces 
the sanction that defendants—at least those defendants who believe 
 
 
enforcement‖); see also infra Part I and notes 23–28. 
 15. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.. 
 16. The federal system is particularly useful because federal prosecutors and defendants 
formalize their deals through ―Section 5K1.1‖ substantial assistance letters, which prosecutors file 
prior to sentencing. The letter‘s moniker is derived from Section 5K1.1 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, which provides, in relevant part: ―[u]pon motion of the government stating that 
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.‖ U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2009). Although the United States Sentencing Guidelines are no 
longer mandatory, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), the Section 5K1.1 letter remains 
one of the primary mechanisms by which criminal defendants obtain reduced sentences, particularly in 
the narcotics context, where more than half of all federal drug offenses are subject to mandatory 
minimum sentences. See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1046 (2004) 













cooperation is a plausible outcome—expect to receive. Part III, however, 
attempts to identify those phenomena that might inflate the Sanction 
Effect beyond efficient levels. They include (a) extending agreements to 
too many defendants, (b) paying them too generously, and (c) either 
causing or failing to debias the defendants‘ optimism regarding the 
likelihood of their cooperation and leniency they might receive at 
sentencing. Through all of these, government actors may undermine 
cooperation‘s value as a crime-fighting mechanism. 
Part IV then considers the interplay between Detection and Sanction 
Effects. This Part begins by addressing the common perception that the 
Detection Effect will likely outweigh the Sanction Effect since defendants 
are substantially more attuned to changes in the probability of getting 
caught than changes in a given sanction. Despite this behavioral truism, 
Sanction Effects may be particularly pernicious in the cooperation context 
when defendants perceive a probable sentence of no incarceration instead 
of a mere reduction in incarceration when they cooperate.
17
 Accordingly, it 
may not be the case that the Detection Effect is always stronger than the 
Sanction Effect. 
In any event, even when the Detection Effect outweighs the Sanction 
Effect, we still should be concerned that our cooperation policy is less 
effective than we presume it to be. Even worse, when the Sanction Effect 
exceeds or matches the Detection Effect, society clearly loses, either by 
encouraging more crime or by implementing a costly policy that fails to 
reduce crime.  
Finally, as Part IV explains, when government actors attempt to cure 
this imbalance, additional costs arise. For example, one way to cure the 
Sanction Effect is to raise the baseline sanction for an underlying crime. 
This, however, creates greater differences in how we treat cooperators and 
noncooperators at sentencing and therefore increases incentives for 
defendants to lie in order to secure cooperation agreements. Those 
falsehoods, in turn, reduce the government‘s ability to detect true 
wrongdoers. In other words, an attempt to cure the Sanction Effect may 
simultaneously harm cooperation‘s Detection Effect. Thus, cooperation‘s 
pathologies, even when acknowledged, are difficult to cure. 
Part V concludes by considering the policy implications of the 
foregoing analysis and calling for more research. Even where cooperation 
has been relatively ―formalized‖ in the federal criminal justice system, our 
knowledge of cooperation is informed by the limited data released by the 
 
 
 17. See discussion infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.  












Sentencing Commission, the anecdotal observations of federal judges, and 
several qualitative analyses published over the previous two decades.
18
 
The analysis contained in this Article seeks to encourage a new round of 
qualitative and quantitative research of both defendants and law 
enforcement actors.  
Finally, the theoretical account of cooperation contained within the 
Article raises two additional points. First, given the incentives for 
prosecutors and law enforcement agents to ―overcooperate,‖ federal 
officials should consider implementing cooperation policy from the more 
centralized Department of Justice, instead of permitting individual United 
States Attorney‘s Offices (much less individual prosecutors) to craft and 
implement their own cooperation policies.
19
 Second, the Article offers a 
timely warning to those regulators intent on expanding or adopting 
cooperation techniques outside the federal criminal context: look before 
you leap. Cooperation is doomed to fall short of its enforcement goals 
when government actors fail to consider the interaction between Detection 
and Sanction Effects.  
I. COOPERATION‘S CONTEXT 
This Part briefly reviews the cooperation literature that has developed 
to date and introduces the context in which the remainder of the Article 
situates its analysis: the federal criminal justice system. As explained 
below, federal criminal law provides a particularly helpful window for 
analyzing and testing cooperation‘s theoretical costs and benefits. 
 
 
 18. The empirical studies of cooperation include: LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. 
KRAMER, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL 
YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE (1998), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf; Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal 
Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999) 
(studying cooperation through interviews with former prosecutors). Other studies focus on federal 
sentencing generally, but include an analysis of cooperation. See Margareth Etienne, The Declining 
Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished 
Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 425, 464–68 
(2004) (including interviews with defense counsel); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen I. Schulhofer, A Tale of 
Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 509 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, 
Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its 
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1997); Jeffrey T. Ulmer, The 
Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual 
Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255 (2005).  
 19. Over a decade ago, Dan Kahan advanced similar arguments with regard to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 













Cooperation ordinarily is analyzed as a variant of plea bargaining 
policy.
20
 Although cooperation has long been the subject of scholarly 
analysis,
21
 much of what has been written either focuses on procedural 
justice or distributive fairness concerns. In other words, much like the plea 
bargaining literature in which cooperation is often lumped, the cooperation 
critique focuses on how the government‘s practices harm defendants, 
either by denying them due process
22
 or by distributing punishment in a 
manner that is inconsistent with some retributive ideal.
23
 As a result, 
cooperation‘s proponents and critics talk past one another. Its defenders 
laud its crime-fighting abilities, and its critics attack its effect on 
defendants and those suspected of wrongdoing.
24
 
With regard to cooperation‘s overall effect on society, some have 
argued that it undermines the government‘s legitimacy, particularly when 
cooperators receive overly generous sentences in exchange for their 
 
 
 20. Compare Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 9, at 1119–20 (lauding cooperation‘s law 
enforcement capabilities), with Weinstein, supra note 2, at 587–88 (arguing that it forces defendants to 
surrender important rights). For classic debates on the general benefits and drawbacks of plea 
bargaining, see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant‟s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932–34 (1983); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 308–17 (1983); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1995–98 (1992); Robert E. 
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). For more recent 
fare, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 
(2004); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008); William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining and Criminal Law‟s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). 
 21. For a historical treatment of cooperation, see George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law 
and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2000) (describing historical practice of 
―approvement,‖ cooperation‘s antecedent practice in England); Graham Hughes, Agreements for 
Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1992) (discussing historical basis of 
cooperation). For a more modern discussion of the problems that accompany cooperation, see the 
articles reproduced from a Symposium held at Cardozo Law School in 2001, entitled The Cooperating 
Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 747 (2002). 
 22. See, e.g., Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal 
Prosecutor‟s Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 
234–39 (1997) (arguing that Sentencing Guidelines vest excessive discretion in prosecutors).  
 23. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 139 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking 
Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 212 (1993) (criticizing cooperation ―paradox‖ 
whereby more culpable defendants receive lesser sentences). But see Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating 
Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT‘G REP. 
292, 294 (1996) (arguing that extent of ―horizontal equity‖ between cooperators and noncooperators is 
an open question).  
 24. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 2, at 565 (arguing that cooperation imposes externalities such 
as ―systemic problems of inequity, damage to the adversary system and the moral ambivalence 
surrounding snitching‖). Although Weinstein treats cooperation as a market, his critique focuses on 
how it affects criminal defendants. In contrast, Richman‘s brief account of costs and benefits in 
Cooperating Defendants, The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, supra 
note 23, is provided from a prosecutor‘s perspective.  














 Others have questioned the reliability of cooperators‘ 
information and convictions based on such testimony.
26
 More recently, 
critics such as Alexandra Natapoff have questioned the policy‘s long-term 
effect on communities that are the sustained targets of criminal 
investigations and the manner by which cooperation and undercover 
investigations increase possibilities for state-sponsored deception and 
abuse.
27
 Under this reasoning, cooperation, and the deceptive police 
practices that often accompany it, affront the social norms that keep 
criminal conduct at bay.
28
  
Because cooperation‘s critics focus on process and punishment, their 
suggested reforms also focus on process and punishment. Thus, they argue 
that interviews with cooperators should be audio- or videotaped to deter 
cooperators from lying and changing stories;
29
 prosecutors should be 
accorded less discretion in deciding who will or will not receive a 
cooperation agreement;
30
 and unwarranted sentencing disparity, to the 
extent it exists, should be reduced.
31
 Whatever their individual merits, 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Milo, 506 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2007) (observing that cooperation 
―lessen[s] public confidence in the law‘s insistence on just deserts [sic], and [undercuts] equal 
treatment vis-a-vis those who similarly offended but happen to have nothing to trade‖); see also 
Richman, supra note 23, at 293 (―One must wonder at the damage done to the force of our laws . . . 
when murderers ‗walk‘ because they were fortunate enough to have others to ‗rat‘ on.‖). 
 26. Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident But 
Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 809 (2002) (arguing that cooperator testimony is suspect 
because people ―are poor human lie detectors‖). 
 27. Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 645, 658–59 (2004) (criticizing lack of transparency in cooperation process); see also Richard 
H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 111–13 
(2005) (citing abuses in undercover investigations that used confidential informants). 
 28. Under the social norms theory, people avoid wrongdoing not because they fear formal 
punishment, but rather because of ―the informal enforcement of social mores by acquaintances, 
bystanders, trading partners, and others.‖ Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social 
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 540 (1998). For a critical analysis of norms theory as it has been 
applied to criminal law, see Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal 
Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 489–95 (2003). For an argument of how 
cooperation may be used to alter undesirable social norms, see Tracy L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law 
and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 805, 825 (1998) (arguing that 
snitching might undermine social norms surrounding juvenile gun possession in the inner city). But see 
Bernard E. Harcourt, After the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design and 
Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 179 (2000) 
(questioning evidentiary support for Kahan and Meares‘s argument).  
 29. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors be Required to Record Their Pretrial 
Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 257 (2005). 
 30. Compare Lee, supra note 22, at 249 (arguing for greater oversight of prosecutorial decisions 
not to cooperate), with Weinstein, supra note 2, at 568 (arguing for numerical cap on number of 
cooperators that prosecutors can use). 
 31. Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 221 (arguing for replacement of mandatory minimum drug 













these reforms miss the larger point: if cooperation fails to deter, then 
government actors ought to reconsider whether to use the policy at all. 
Failure to address the question is thus a serious gap in the cooperation 
literature.  
Indeed, this presumption of deterrence allows both current users and 
future adopters of the policy to overstate its value. For example, in an 
August 2009 speech to the New York City Bar Association, Robert 
Khuzami, the newly appointed Director of the Enforcement Division of 
the SEC, announced his intention to improve the SEC‘s enforcement 
muscle by ―incentivizing cooperation by individuals‖ in SEC 
investigations.
32
 In early January 2010, Khuzami announced the SEC‘s 
―Cooperation Initiative,‖ which imported the broad outlines of federal 
criminal cooperation policy. As is the case for federal criminals, under the 




Khuzami‘s proposal was itself an extension of the SEC‘s ―Seaboard‖ 
decision. In Seaboard, the SEC established a policy whereby it would 
impose less punishment on regulated entities whose officers and directors 
cooperated during the course of an investigation.
34
 Seaboard, in turn, was 
itself an offshoot of the Department of Justice‘s internal guidelines for 
prosecuting business organizations for their employees‘ criminal offenses. 
Like the SEC, the DOJ has awarded cooperative corporations with lesser 
punishment (deferred prosecution agreements instead of criminal 
indictments), assuming the corporations meet conditions laid out by the 
 
 
culpable defendants received worse sentences because they had less valuable information with which 
to bargain—was later rebutted by Maxfield and Kramer‘s report, supra note 18, at 12–14, which 
indicated that self-professed high-level drug dealers received cooperation agreements less frequently 
than low-level offenders. Importantly, the report did not address the reliability of the prosecutors‘ 
determination as to the relative culpability of offenders. For a more recent indication that the paradox 
remains a problem, see David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning 
Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9 n.125, 
40 (2008) (reporting concerns of federal judges).  
 32. Robert Khuzami, Dir. of Enforcement Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Remarks Before the 
New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm). Khuzami is also a former 
federal prosecutor in the United States Attorney‘s Office for the Southern District of New York 
(Manhattan).  
 33. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage 
Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm).  
 34. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (Seaboard Report), [2001–2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 74,985 (Oct. 23, 
2001); SEC DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 4.3, 
at 99–100 (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.  














 Separately, the DOJ‘s Antitrust Division has granted 
immunity to those corporations (and in some instances, to the 
corporation‘s employees) who admit their participation in cartels and 
provide the Antitrust Division with information about the other members 
of the cartels.
36
 Finally, administrative agencies have implemented a whole 
host of ―self-regulatory‖ regimes whereby government agencies apply a 
lenient sanction to business organizations in exchange for their disclosure 
of legal and administrative violations and their assistance in identifying 
and sanctioning wayward employees.
37
  
Until now, ―regulatory cooperation‖ has focused primarily on corporate 
entities, whose owners effectively are rewarded when the company‘s 
managers and directors identify and turn on fellow employees and 
officers.
38
 The SEC‘s recent announcement, however, demonstrates a 
desire to import individual, criminal-style cooperation into the regulatory 
context. Regulators would do well to pause before doing that, however, 
because entity- and individual-level cooperation differ substantially.  
First, whereas the government imposes cooperative obligations on 
corporations in order to leverage private enforcement resources,
39
 the 
purpose of individual criminal cooperation is to enable the government‘s 




Second, unlike corporate cooperation, individual cooperation does not 
condition the individual criminal‘s cooperation agreement on his ex ante 
 
 
 35. The Filip Memorandum can be found in U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL 
§ 9-28.000, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2011).  
 36. Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1630–31 (2008).  
 37. See, e.g., Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1107–33 
(2006) (observing that numerous federal administrative agencies and departments decide entity-based 
liability by considering the entity‘s cooperation with enforcement authorities in the identification and 
punishment of culpable employees).  
 38. Ellen S. Podgor lays out some of the differences between individual and organization-level 
cooperation in White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in Employer-Employee Relationships, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (2002).  
 39. Cf. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 696 (pointing out that firms may be able to sanction 
their employees more cheaply than government actors).  
 40. The difference may be due partially to the fact that corporate cooperation interposes a third 
party, the corporate employer, between the government and targeted employee. See Samuel W. Buell, 
Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2007) (developing ―tripartite‖ 
model for understanding prosecutions of corporate employees). This additional layer alters both the 
incentives to seek cooperation (on both sides), as well as the ability to comply with, and verify 
compliance with, a given cooperation agreement. See also Arlen, supra note 5, at 834–35 (explaining 













efforts to prevent his own, much less others‘, crimes. This is a significant 
difference, because in order to secure the benefits of cooperation, putative 
corporate ―cooperators‖ effectively must put in place policing and 
prevention systems long before any wrongdoing has been detected by the 
government.
41
 By contrast, the average individual defendant need not 
decide whether to cooperate until shehe or she has been arrested, when she 
presumably has substantial incentives to seek a means of reducing her 
(likely) sentence. Thus, whereas corporate cooperation may impose ex 
ante compliance costs on firms, individual cooperation does not appear to 
require any level of ―self regulation‖ prior to the government‘s 
apprehension of wrongdoers. 
In sum, although in both instances the government must ―pay‖ the 
cooperator (entity or individual person) a bounty for assisting the 
government, the actors‘ incentives to consume and purchase cooperation 
in the individual context differ significantly from the incentives that arise 
in the corporate context.
42
 Whereas much has been written regarding the 
incentives and disincentives for corporate entities to cooperate, this Article 
focuses primarily on the decision-making process from the perspective of 
the individual, and not the organizational, cooperator.  
A final caveat is in order. Some readers may assume, based on media 
reports and popular culture, that the bulk of federal criminal cooperation is 
reserved either for the prosecution of blockbuster Enron-style corporate 
frauds, or for the prosecution of highly structured and organized crime 
families, such as the Gambino family. This is, however, an incomplete 
portrayal. 
Nearly 10,000 defendants who were sentenced in the federal criminal 





 41. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 699 (describing difference between policing and 
prevention mechanisms). Because corporations must make this ―cooperation‖ decision before they 
have become the focus of a government investigation, they may shy away from cooperation-based 
measures that have the effect of detecting rather than preventing internal crime, as detection efforts 
increase the entity‘s expected liability. Id. at 707–08.  
 42. Under this model, the ―bounty‖ that the government must pay to induce the corporation‘s 
private enforcement is either an adjusted sanction to reflect the firm‘s investment in the increased 
probability of punishment, or a two-tiered system that imposes strict liability on all firms, plus an 
added sanction on those firms that fail to implement adequate detection and prevention measures. 
Arlen, supra note 5, at 856–58.  
 43. See 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.30 (reporting that 9,498 defendants received 
5K1.1 letters). The United States Sentencing Guidelines (―Guidelines‖) set forth advisory sentence 
ranges for federal criminal offenses. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) 
(concluding that Guidelines must be advisory in order to pass muster under Sixth Amendment of 
Constitution). Although courts are no longer obliged to adhere to the ranges set forth in the Guidelines, 
a Section 5K1.1 letter remains one of the common methods by which defendants achieve substantial 












which expressed the government‘s view that they were in fact 
―cooperators‖ worthy of a reduction in their criminal sentences.
44
 The 
primary charge for over half the members of that group related to the sale 
of narcotics.
45
 This is not new; drug dealers have represented at least half 
of the cooperator ―pool‖ for the last ten years.
46
 The rest of the pool is split 
between defendants convicted of firearms (854 defendants in 2008), fraud 
(1006), and a host of other crimes, which range from robbery (113) to 
more ―white collar‖ fare, such as forgery (102) and tax violations (108).
47
 
Even the ―fraud‖ category of cooperators is quite broad, as it includes all 
cooperating defendants who have committed mail, wire, securities, bank, 
credit card, and other frauds. Judging by the median sentence for fraud 
(twelve months‘ imprisonment in 2008), most of these frauds are garden-
variety scams and not billion-dollar Ponzi schemes.
48
  
Thus, the low-level, mildly culpable employee of a Fortune 500 
company who assists the government in prosecuting ten corporate officers 
is not typical of the cooperator pool. Instead, it is the mid-level drug dealer 
offering the government the possibility of a diffuse network of cocaine 
suppliers and competitors. Nor is the transparently structured, publicly 
 
 
sentence reductions. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 137, 149 (2005) (explaining that the Section 5K1.1 motion ―unlock[s] the Guidelines, 
allowing the judge to depart below the otherwise applicable sentencing range‖). Moreover, where 
mandatory minimum statutes apply, defendants seeking a sentence beneath the statutory minimum 
either must cooperate successfully or, in narcotics cases, seek relief under Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 3553(f), the so-called ―safety valve‖ provision. The ―safety valve‖ permits first-time, 
nonviolent defendants who were not supervisors in the offense to escape the mandatory minimum 
sentence, provided they plead guilty and provide law enforcement agents truthful information about 
their crime. See Ryan Scott Reynolds, Note, Equal Justice Under Law: Post-Booker, Should Federal 
Judges Be Able to Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between 
Codefendants‟ Sentences?, 109 COLUM L. REV. 538, 544 (2009). 
 44. Caren Myers Morrison points out that this list is underinclusive as it does not include federal 
cooperators for whom the government filed motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 35 (―Rule 35‖), 
which permits the government to file a motion for a reduction in the length of the defendant‘s sentence 
based on the defendant‘s substantial assistance to the government. Whereas a Section 5K1.1 
substantial assistance motion is filed prior to the defendant‘s sentencing, a Rule 35 motion can be filed 
up to a year following the date of the defendant‘s sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines track the 
former, but not the latter. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating 
Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 936 
(2009) (criticizing discrepancy in data collection).  
 45. See 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.30. Narcotics defendants are overrepresented in 
the cooperator pool; drug related offenses made up just 32.6% of the overall offender pool that year. 
Id. at fig.A.  
 46. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, 
tbl.30 (1999–2008); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 579–80 & n.57 (observing, in 1996, that narcotics 
defendants were a substantial proportion of cooperators). 
 47. 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.30. 













held corporation typical of the criminal organizations that the government 
prosecutes. To the contrary, most are smaller, more informal groups with 
less stable levels of hierarchy. Here again, the statistics are illuminating: in 
2008, of 67,887 defendants sentenced for criminal conduct, only 4.4% 
received an enhancement for an ―aggravating role‖ as an organizer, leader, 
or supervisor in an offense.
49
 Either the government is doing a very poor 
job of identifying and prosecuting leaders, or many offenders avoid large, 
hierarchical criminal organizations. 
Several implications flow from these conclusions. First, in many 
criminal cases, cooperators will promise payoffs—additional convictions 
and investigations—that are difficult to value. It is one thing to ―sign up‖ a 
cooperator who has information about insider trading within a well-
known, successful, and formerly respected hedge fund; such a prosecution 
may be quite salient for the other members of that industry. It is quite 
another matter to enter into an agreement with a cooperator who can 
implicate one or two of her cocaine suppliers.  
Second, and equally important, the informality of the criminal 
organization will allow more people to cooperate, even if the government 
sincerely desires to use cooperators to prosecute other defendants who 
committed equally or more serious crimes. Even if government agents 
prefer to use lesser criminals to cooperate against more serious ones, they 
may encounter difficulty discerning who the most culpable person is 
within an organization, if they can in fact even identify that organization 
fully. Moreover, because much of cooperation will involve smaller, fluid 
groups, even the ―heads‖ of those groups will have the ability to cooperate 
by providing assistance in prosecuting the members of other, (allegedly) 
more serious groups.  
In sum, the paradigmatic image of the prosecutor using ―little fish‖ to 
swallow ―bigger fish‖ simply may not hold. With this more ambiguous 
backdrop in mind, the remainder of this Article picks apart cooperation‘s 
relative benefits and costs.  
II. THE DETECTION EFFECT OF COOPERATION 
Cooperation exerts two competing effects on would-be violators. The 
first is a Detection Effect, whereby the government increases its ability to 
detect and prosecute wrongdoers. Because cooperation leverages the 
government‘s ability to enforce and detect crime, rational violators should 
 
 
 49. Id. at tbl.18. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (2009) (setting forth 
provisions and criteria for ―aggravating role‖ in offense enhancement).  












presume that cooperation increases their chances of getting caught. Having 
come to this conclusion, they either will be deterred or take (potentially 
costly) measures to avoid detection. Commentators who commend 
cooperation‘s crime-fighting value implicitly reference the Detection 
Effect. 
The second and less discussed aspect of cooperation, which I discuss in 
Part III, is cooperation‘s Sanction Effect. Because the cooperators 
themselves receive a lesser prison sentence in exchange for their 




To understand the competing Detection and Sanction Effects of a 
cooperation-based law enforcement policy, it is useful to first review the 
traditional theory of deterrence, which is premised on the neoclassical 
rational actor. Admittedly, the neoclassical view of intentional 
wrongdoing cannot provide a complete explanation of why people fail to 
comply with the law. Nevertheless, it provides a starting point for 
understanding the potential value—and the corresponding limitations—of 
a law enforcement policy that relies in large part on the assumption that it 
improves deterrence.  
A. Neoclassical Economics and Deterrence  
Under Gary Becker‘s famous formulation, the rational actor refrains 
from wrongdoing when the expected costs of such conduct outweigh its 
expected benefits.
51
 That is, when the benefit the actor can expect from a 
crime is outweighed by the sanction, S, multiplied by the probability of 
getting caught and punished, p, the actor rationally decides not to commit 
the crime. Society, in turn, should take efforts to deter criminals from 
engaging in such conduct when the aggregate benefits of such conduct are 





 50. The ―Sanction Effect‖ refers to the criminal‘s expected sanction once she is caught. Her 
overall expected cost of criminal conduct combines the Detection Effect and the Sanction Effect. Thus, 
her expected cost of criminal conduct may go up or down depending on how she weighs the two 
effects.  
 51. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968). 
 52. ―Social welfare is taken to be the sum of the gains less the harms associated with the subset 
of individuals who commit harmful acts.‖ A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be 
Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 430 (1994). 
For torts, Polinsky and Shavell argue that society should ordinarily set the injurer‘s cost to exceed the 
harm, and not his gain. Id. Where wrongdoers derive utility solely from malicious conduct, however, 
Polinsky and Shavell agree that punishment should be set to wipe out the wrongdoer‘s gain since the 













Although Becker treated probability and sanctions as fungible 





concluded that the offenders responded more readily to increases in 
probability than they did to increases in sanctions. Accordingly, 
government actors who wish to reduce crime must apportion some 
resources toward detecting offenders. 
The government can increase the probability of detection in a number 
of ways.
55
 It can hire new agents and officers to investigate reports of 
wrongdoing or otherwise increase law enforcement agencies‘ budgets.
56
 It 
can impose ex ante disclosure and monitoring requirements on regulated 
entities, thereby making it more difficult for wrongdoers to evade 
detection. It can encourage innocent victims and witnesses of crimes to 
come forward with information, either through laws that protect them from 





Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 909–10 (1998); see also Keith N. Hylton, Punitive 
Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (explaining that 
―complete deterrence‖ in criminal law ordinarily attempts to wipe out the criminal‘s gain). For the 
sake of simplicity, I assume that harms and gains are equivalent.  
 53. For theoretical accounts of why sanctions and probability of detection differ in importance, 
see Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of Discounting for Equitable 
Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115 (2007) (arguing that time lag between commission of crime and 
imposition of punishment creates discount on sanction); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On 
the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1999) (introducing concepts of both declining disutility and discounting of extended periods of 
imprisonment); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245–46 (1985) (explaining how uniformly maximal sanctions 
eliminate marginal deterrence of less harmful crimes). 
 54. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 
80 IND. L.J. 155, 200–01 (2005) (explaining that criminal defendants‘ ability to adapt to imprisonment 
reduces effectiveness of longer prison sentences); Darley, supra note 10; Robinson & Darley, supra 
note 13 (citing empirical research); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 380 & nn.112–13 (1997) (citing empirical research and theorizing 
that changes in the probability of detection may signal greater social meaning about the crime than 
changes in the sanction).  
 55. The ―p‖ in Becker‘s equation is often referred to as a probability of detection. That term, 
however, encompasses the apprehension, conviction, and implementation of a given sanction. ―[T]he 
probability of sanction . . . . is determined by a series of sequential events (such as being caught by the 
police, being charged by a prosecutor, and being convicted by a court in accordance with the various 
procedural rules of the legal system).‖ Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities 
Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 983 (2009).  
 56. For example, the Financial Economic Recovery Act of 2009, enacted in the wake of the 
subprime mortgage meltdown, authorized the appropriation of 245 million dollars to several law 
enforcement agencies, for each of fiscal years 2010 and 2011. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 
COST ESTIMATE, FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT OF 2009, S. 386, 111TH CONG. (2009), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10030/s386.pdf. 
 57. Within criminal organizations, witnesses who are themselves innocent but who are aware of 
wrongdoing by others are often referred to as ―whistle-blowers.‖ For an economic analysis of whistle-












although this list is hardly exhaustive—the government can enact broad 
laws and regulations that cover a large swathe of conduct and reduce the 
likelihood that wrongdoers will find legal loopholes through which to 
justify or immunize their conduct.
58
 
All of these tactics are helpful. Cooperation, however, provides unique 
advantages to law enforcement agents, several of which I describe below.  
B. Cooperation‟s Detection Effect 
Cooperation increases the probability of detection in a number of ways, 




1. Eliciting Information 
Cooperation benefits the government by encouraging defendants to 
proffer information at an early stage of the government‘s prosecution.
60
 
This information includes (a) details that fill in blanks in the government‘s 
case against the defendant, (b) new information about other defendants 
and suspects, (c) information about the efficacy of the government‘s 
investigation techniques, and (d) insights on the defendant‘s bargaining 
position and willingness to go to trial.  
It is no secret that the unequal bargaining position between prosecutor 
and defense attorney serves as an information-forcing device. Whereas the 
prosecutor often may choose her cooperator from a group of willing 
defendants, the defendant has no choice but to take his information to the 
prosecutor trying his case.
61
 Except in those instances in which 
prosecutors in neighboring jurisdictions actively compete for the same 






blowing policies, see Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower 
Policy, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 157 (2008). 
 58. Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 
1583 n.200, 1584 n.203 (2005).  
 59. ―To the extent that devoting more attention to one type of crime increases the probability of 
detection, conviction, and punishment of criminal wrongdoing, this will result in a deterrent effect on 
that crime.‖ Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for Sentencing of 
Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 503, 511 (2000). 
 60. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 929 (discussing pressure to cooperate early). 
 61. The defendant nevertheless retains some bargaining power depending on the uniqueness of 
his information, the strength of the government‘s case, and the abilities of the defendant‘s defense 
counsel to parlay these factors into a concrete benefit. 













Cooperation produces information not simply because the government 
controls the process, but also because it has the power to limit the number 
of cooperation agreements available to defendants.
63
 As discussed below, 
scarcity provokes competition by defendants, and competition in turn 
yields information for government investigators and prosecutors.
64
  
For every defendant who receives a cooperation agreement, some 
undefined additional number will at least ―try out‖ for such an agreement 
by meeting with the government and proffering information. Even when 
the government ―pays‖ a cooperator for her assistance in prosecuting 
another defendant, it receives far more than the single cooperator‘s 
assistance. In addition to the cooperator‘s help, the government receives 
the information streams from all of the defendants who have met with 
government agents in the course of the government‘s investigation and 
who attempted, but ultimately failed, to secure a cooperation agreement.  
Consider the average defendant who seeks cooperation and attends a 
typical ―proffer‖ session. If the government‘s case already is strong, the 
defendant will likely conclude that the opportunity costs of cooperation 
are rather low.
65
 The upside is a vastly reduced sentence, which, prior to 
the Supreme Court‘s decision in Booker, may have seemed quite unlikely 
given the (previously) mandatory nature of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.
66
 Accordingly, even if the defendant maintains a healthy 
skepticism regarding his chances of becoming a cooperator (and 
behavioral psychology would suggest that he will do exactly the 
 
 
formally or informally—in order to maintain their monopoly power over the cooperation process. See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, Organization and Functions Manual No. 27: Coordination of Parallel 
Criminal, Civil, and Administrative Proceedings (1997), in UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/doj00027.htm 
(coordinating criminal and civil white-collar crime proceedings across agencies); Michael Simons, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 957 n.292 (2000) (describing federal-state coordination guidelines).  
 63. Pro-defense commentators have criticized the government‘s monopoly over such agreements. 
See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 2, at 580–81 (observing that many more defendants with narcotics 
charges provide information than receive cooperation agreements).  
 64. Weinstein‘s proposed reform, to cap the number of cooperation agreements at some arbitrary 
number, see id. at 568, is thus counterproductive. Prosecutors already have incentives to create a sense 
of scarcity in order to pressure defendants to compete for cooperation. At least until the cap was 
reached (which the government would do everything possible to hide), a specific cap on cooperation 
agreements would increase the government‘s leverage over defendants, who would now be competing 
for even more limited resources.  
 65. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 592–93 (theorizing that even small chance of mitigation 
causes defendants to ―flock to proffer sessions‖). 
 66. In Booker, the Supreme Court held that sentencing courts were not bound by the Guidelines‘ 
sentencing ranges, thereby permitting courts to sentence defendants according to the broader factors 
set forth by Congress in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 245 (2005).  














), he will likely conclude that he has much to gain by offering 
his assistance.  
Once he attends the proffer, the defendant will answer the 
government‘s questions and provide information about his own crime, 
other crimes, and any number of topics. Regardless of whether he becomes 
a cooperator, at least some of his information will assist the government. 
He may identify new suspects, confirm the government‘s instincts (good 
or bad) about another cooperator‘s information, illuminate certain aspects 
of his crime that enable the government to improve current or future 
investigations, and clarify information that the government possesses but 
does not fully comprehend.  
Even a proffer that yields none of the benefits described above will 
provide value. Apart from the content of a proffer, the fact that a defendant 
is willing to speak to the government conveys valuable ―meta‖ 
information, such as the defendant‘s willingness to take the case to trial, 
his attorney‘s willingness and ability to defend his client at trial, and 
whether the defendant (or his attorney) believes that he has a viable 
defense.
68
 Granted, the government may sometimes infer the wrong signal. 
Over time, however, cooperation provides additional information that aids 
and informs the government‘s litigation strategy. 
The fact of the defendant‘s proffer (assuming it is communicated to 
others) also aids the government insofar as it exploits coordination and 
collective action problems among defendants.
69
 The possibility of 
cooperation enhances the government‘s bargaining position if all of the 
defendants in the case either know or assume that the government is 
conducting proffers and choosing cooperators.
70
 In a classic example of 
the prisoner‘s dilemma, each co-defendant‘s self-interested conduct harms 
the group‘s collective interest in remaining silent.
71
 Arguably, this 
 
 
 67. For a discussion on the overoptimism of defendants regarding their sentences, see Bibas, 
supra note 20, at 2500. 
 68. In some cases, the fact that the prosecution is willing to consider cooperating also transmits 
information to defense attorneys. Proffers may thus serve as the first step in a process that ultimately 
leads to a more efficient plea bargain than if the parties had never met. Cf. Russell D. Covey, Signaling 
and Plea Bargaining‟s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73 (2009) (using similar 
argument to explain benefits of police interrogations).  
 69. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners‟ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 737 (2009) (explaining that collective action and coordination problems cause defendants to 
accept plea bargains rather than demand en masse that prosecutors take their cases to trial). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125, 127–28 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding a 
downward departure despite the government‘s unwillingness to file ―substantial assistance‖ motion 
because defendant‘s cooperation with authorities ―‗broke the log jam‘ in a multi-defendant case‖ and 
caused other defendants to negotiate guilty pleas with the prosecutor). 













dynamic would exist regardless of cooperation. Nevertheless, by elevating 
the stakes, cooperation exacerbates the prisoner‘s dilemma.
72
 
Finally, the competition to become a cooperator often provides the 
government with sufficient information to convict multiple defendants, 
regardless of whether they become cooperators.
73
 Although the proffering 
defendant often signs an agreement that limits how the prosecutor may use 
his statements in the government‘s case in chief, the prosecutor still can 
use much of the proffered information to the government‘s advantage.
74
 
For example, most agreements permit the government to use the 
defendant‘s statements for impeachment at trial.
75
 Accordingly, once the 
defendant has himself admitted wrongdoing to agents and the government, 
his ability to testify in his own defense will likely be foreclosed, as will his 
ability to generate any argument that is inconsistent with what he said 
during the proffer session.
76
 Moreover, proffer agreements usually do not 
preclude the government from gathering derivative evidence from the 
defendant‘s proffered information.
77
 This leaves government agents free to 
 
 
unarmed soldiers facing a single opponent with a single bullet in his gun demanding that they all 
surrender. If these soldiers collectively decide to charge their opponent in unison, they would be able 
to overcome the threat. . . . Their problem, though, is that it is in the interest of any single soldier to 
duck, to defect from the front line, and to let others mount the charge.‖).  
 72. Although some defendants might overcome the prisoner‘s dilemma by threatening would-be 
cooperators with violence, the strategy can backfire. See, e.g., United States v. Spinelli, 551 F.3d 159, 
162 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining how organized crime family‘s threats upon one of its members caused 
him to agree to cooperate with the government).  
 73. Justice Souter observed as much in his dissent in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 
218 (1995), that for the defendant who proffers but fails to secure a cooperation agreement, ―the 
possibility of trial . . . will be reduced to fantasy.‖  
 74. Proffer agreements are described at length by Rasmusen, supra note 7, at 1545–47 
(describing three categories of proffer agreements that allow the government to use the defendant‘s 
proffer statements in subsequent prosecutions in increasingly broad circumstances). See also Steven 
Glaser, Proffer Agreements: To Execute or Not to Execute?, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 2008; Benjamin A. 
Naftalis, Note, “Queen for a Day” Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the 
Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (2003) (discussing use of 
agreements). 
 75. Although the defendant‘s statements are made in the course of plea negotiations and 
therefore governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f), the 
Supreme Court has held that the defendant can waive these rights with regard to the prosecution‘s 
impeachment of the defendant‘s testimony at trial. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210.  
 76. Although Mezzanatto addressed the narrower question of using the defendant‘s proffer 
statements to impeach his own testimony, proffer agreements have since expanded to allow 
prosecutors to use proffer statements ―not only for impeachment of the defendant, but also in rebuttal 
and in the government‘s case-in-chief when defense counsel makes statements or elicits testimony that 
conflicts with the proffer.‖ Naftalis, supra note 74, at 3. 
 77. A standard proffer agreement form used in the United States Attorney‘s Office for the 
Southern District of New York plainly states, at paragraph 3, that government agents may gather and 
use derivative evidence against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution. THE NEW YORK CRIMINAL 












establish new leads and strengthen its case against the defendant regardless 
of whether he subsequently cooperates. Thus, although it does not take the 
place of a confession, the defendant‘s proffer session vastly reduces his 
option of proceeding to trial. Indeed, insofar as the proffer system reduces 
the effectiveness of lying subsequently at trial, cooperation increases the 
―truth-finding‖ function of the criminal justice system.  
2. Altering Criminal Conduct Ex Ante  
In addition to eliciting information from defendants following their 
arrest, cooperation alters criminal behavior prior to arrest. Because anyone 
could be (or become) a cooperator, criminals must invest time and energy 
screening their co-conspirators, victims, and associates. Moreover, 
because cooperators help undercover agents gain access to organizations 
by posing as potential clients, co-conspirators, or victims, cooperation 
similarly forces criminals to screen for undercover stings.
78
 A second-
order aspect of the Detection Effect is that it increases the cost of doing 
criminal business, thereby deterring crime.  
Scholars already have recognized cooperation‘s deterrent effect on 
conspiracies. In their seminal respective accounts of conspiracy law and 
collective sanctions, Neal Katyal and Daryl Levinson laid the groundwork 
for understanding how cooperation leverages law enforcement power.
79
 As 
Katyal and Levinson separately demonstrated, group liability creates 
incentives to cooperate; if five criminals conspire to commit a crime and 
all can be charged for participating in the same conspiracy, then each of 
the five may be held liable for committing that crime, regardless of his or 
her particular role in the offense. True, this dynamic may encourage 
criminals to be more careful ex ante to work together and avoid detection, 
but it also encourages them to break ranks and talk once they are caught. 
 
 
BAR ASSOCIATION, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PROFFER AGREEMENT FORM (2001), 
available at http://nycrimbar.org/Members/otherlinks/Forms/Proffer-SDNY.pdf.  
 78. ―[C]riminals must be more cautious once they are aware that their clients—or even their 
recruiters and bosses—in criminal transactions could be government agents.‖ Dru Stevenson, 
Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REV. 67, 107 (2004). 
Bruce Hay provides an expanded theoretical account of how undercover operations affect deterrence 
efforts. Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387 
(2005). 
 79. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003); Daryl J. Levinson, 
Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 398–400 (2003). Katyal‘s piece exhaustively sets forth 
the various benefits of imposing criminal conspiracy liability on group conduct. Levinson applies the 
broader concept of ―collective sanctions‖ (criminal or civil) to, among others, individuals who are 
themselves innocent of wrongdoing but who ―are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and 













Therefore, the government need apprehend only one of the five in order to 
further its investigation.
80
 Cooperation allows the government to realize 
the benefits of group liability and thereby weakens bonds between 
wrongdoers ex ante.
81
 The uncertainty created by both dynamics 
destabilizes criminal conduct within group settings. Criminals who know 
that cooperators will trade information and assistance ex post are more 
inclined to choose their conspirators more carefully, use norms or 
payments to bond their co-conspirators to the conspiracy, and watch for 
signs of defection.
82
 Collectively, these ―agency costs‖
83
 divert criminals‘ 
energies away from the ―profit-generating‖ premise of their criminal 
enterprise. They spend more time and energy watching their backs and less 
time harming others. Indeed, the dynamic extends beyond the typical 




The story, however, is not all positive. If cooperation increases the 
agency costs of groups, then criminals should respond either by reducing 
their size or finding alternate ways of screening and bonding their 
members. Notice, however, that these methods themselves (gang initiation 
rites and organized family oaths, for example) may generate additional 
costs to society. When one gang member threatens to kill another member 
if she snitches on the group, the second gang member may respond by 
committing more crime on the group‘s behalf in order to prove her loyalty. 
Thus, attempts to reduce the agency costs of cooperation may result in 
more, and not less, harm to society.  
Moreover, by encouraging criminals to reduce the size of their 
conspiracies, cooperation ironically may result in leaner and more efficient 
 
 
 80. ―Conspiracy law makes it possible for prosecutors to threaten low-level conspirators with 
severe sentences and then offer them reductions in exchange for inculpatory evidence about higher-
level conspirators.‖ Levinson, supra note 79, at 399. Levinson does not consider the extent to which 
prosecutors might fail to distinguish culpability among conspirators and inadvertently favor ―high-
level‖ conspirators who inculpate their unlucky, less culpable colleagues.  
 81. Katyal, supra note 79, at 1340–43.  
 82. ―Conspiracy law encourages organizations to adopt practices, such as employee monitoring, 
that generate inefficiencies, stymie group identity, and sow distrust within the group.‖ Katyal, supra 
note 79, at 1334.  
 83. Agency costs are the costs that accrue when an agent fails to act in accordance with his 
principal‘s wishes. To prevent ―shirking,‖ the principal must expend resources monitoring and 
bonding the agent. The total costs of the relationship include monitoring and bonding costs, plus the 
costs of whatever residual shirking remains. See generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL 
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 87–99 (2007) (chapter co-written with Eric 
Posner). 
 84. Cooperators need not be accomplices or co-conspirators; they can be victims or mere 
acquaintances. Cooperation thus reduces incentives not just to conspire with other criminals, but also 
to interact with anyone. 












groups. Just as corporate actors grow beyond efficient boundaries due to 
hubris or empire building, so too might criminal groups.
 85
 Cooperation 
thus reminds criminals to behave more efficiently. 
In markets for illegal substances, cooperation‘s effect on size may 
generate a more ―competitive‖ market, thereby reducing price and 
increasing availability. For example, between 1980 and 1992, despite the 
fact that the government strongly policed the drug trade, the per gram 
price of cocaine and heroin dropped significantly and output increased in 
the United States.
86
 Some researchers theorize that price dropped and 
output expanded because law enforcement efforts broke up previously 
large cartels.
87
 Narcotics became cheaper, and demand increased. Smaller 
and perhaps more successful groups then committed (at least in the 
aggregate) more crime.
88
 Cooperation may have reduced the size of the 
typical drug conspiracy, but the overall harm to society remained constant 
or in fact increased.  
At best, then, the most we might say is that cooperation places certain 
pressures on group-oriented conduct. As Katyal and Levinson have 
argued, these pressures may indeed redound to society‘s benefit, and if 
they do, they are not limited to formal criminal conspiracies; criminals can 
cooperate against their competitors and sometimes even strangers. 
Nevertheless, cooperation‘s effect on ex ante conduct is not easy to 
control, and, at least in some instances, it may leave society worse off. Yet 
again, the net Detection Benefit will likely depend on context.  
3. Leveraging the Benefits of Stealth 
Cooperation enables the government to improve its detection abilities 
stealthily without alerting particular suspects that they are the subjects of 
an investigation.
89
 For example, when the SEC announces with great 
 
 
 85. Ironically, cooperation may force criminals who irrationally prefer large enterprises (due 
either to empire-building concerns or hubris) to implement their wrongdoing through smaller and more 
efficient entities.  
 86. Abdala Mansour, Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongain, Gangs and Crime Deterrence, 22 J.L. 
ECON & ORG. 315, 316–18 (2006). Prices may also decrease because the threat of enforcement forces 
purchasers and sellers to forego optimal bargaining. See Beth A. Freeborn, Arrest Avoidance: Law 
Enforcement and the Price of Cocaine, 52 J.L. & ECON. 19 (2009).  
 87. Id. 
 88. By the same token, cooperation might simply crowd out some of the more risk-averse and 
possibly less dangerous criminals, leaving the rest of the field to their more entrepreneurial and risk-
preferring colleagues. See, e.g., Brendan O‘Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, Why Have Robberies Become Less 
Frequent but More Violent?, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 519 (2009) (theorizing that deterrence 
strategies reduce absolute number of robberies but leave more violent offenders in the robbery pool).  













fanfare a massive increase in enforcement spending, it creates several 
responses among those who practice in the securities industry. It deters 
some potential offenders by causing them to revise the probability of 
detection and conclude that the costs of criminal conduct outweigh the 
perceived benefits. It alerts other individuals to invest in detection 
avoidance techniques.
90
 Finally, it spurs other offenders to choose alternate 
forms of misconduct that cause equal or greater harm.
91
  
Because it combines elements of conspicuous and unobserved policing, 
cooperation achieves the best of both worlds: it preserves the criminal‘s 
incentive to expend resources on detection avoidance, while rendering 
those efforts less effective.
92
 That is, although criminal suspects know 
generally that any of their co-conspirators, victims, or associates might be 
cooperators (or, for that matter, undercover agents), they usually do not 
know which ones are cooperators. As a result, criminals lack perfect 
information to make efficient choices on how to order their affairs.  
Accordingly, cooperation increases the risk of apprehension, but it does 
so in an ambiguous manner.
93
 Ambiguity, in turn, persuades some would-
be offenders to desist or substitute alternate conduct.
94
 Meanwhile, the 
stealthy nature of cooperation at least enables the government to 
apprehend and incapacitate those stalwart offenders who would go ahead 
with their intended course of action no matter what. 
Consider a City that wishes to increase the likelihood of catching those 
who deal in narcotics. Assume the City plans to do this by increasing the 
 
 
William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903 (1993).  
 90. See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1337 
(2006).  
 91. Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence‟s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2391–2402 (1997); see 
also Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 6–8 (1998) (explaining how deterrence is affected by perception).  
 92. Avraham Tabbach recently theorized that because punishment avoidance efforts can be 
costly to criminals, they should be encouraged insofar as they substitute for costlier punishments such 
as imprisonment. Tabbach realizes, however, that avoidance efforts are socially undesirable if the 
offender can externalize them onto innocent parties. See Avraham D. Tabbach, The Social Desirability 
of Punishment Avoidance, 26 J.L. ECON & ORG. 269 (2009).  
 93. Although criminals may, as a general rule, be ―risk-seeking,‖ they still may avoid uncertain 
or ambiguous situations. See Stevenson, supra note 58, at 1574–77 (distinguishing uncertainty from 
risk); see also Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All “Legal Dollars” Created Equal?, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 223, 232 n.45 (2008) (―[T]he behavioral literature distinguishes between perceptions of risk 
(when the probability of the event is known) and perceptions of uncertainty (when the probability of 
the event is unknown).‖).  
 94. See Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An 
Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 473–74 (2004) (making similar arguments for periodic 
―enforcement campaigns‖); Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and 
Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 276 (1999).  












number of police detectives assigned to narcotics activity in certain 
neighborhoods. When the City increases its enforcement efforts, it has two 
choices. It can increase enforcement efforts conspicuously or secretly. If 
the increase in enforcement efforts is transparent, the announced increase 
might deter putative wrongdoers by causing them to conclude that they are 
highly likely to be apprehended and that the expected sanction outweighs 
the expected value of the conduct. Moreover, announced increases in 
enforcement efforts may encourage private actors to assist the government 
in apprehending and identifying wrongdoing because a show of 
government force expresses the community‘s view that the conduct is 
wrong and will not be tolerated. The government‘s enforcement conduct 




Alternately, conspicuous enforcement may backfire. Among other 
things, it may cause putative victims to become less vigilant
96
 and enable 
wrongdoers to engage in detection avoidance.
97
 That is, by announcing its 
increase in enforcement, the government gives ample warning to the 
wrongdoer to alter her conduct so as not to be apprehended. Still, similar 
to the increased agency costs of group conduct discussed in Section 2 
supra, conspicuous enforcement is valuable when it forces criminals to 
divert energy to cover-ups and away from additional harm.  
Unfortunately, as is the case with agency costs, criminals can pass 
avoidance costs on to others and thereby exacerbate the costs of crime.
98
 A 
top executive who has already embezzled money from a company account 
may respond to an internal audit by creating fake customer invoices to 
cover his otherwise unexplained withdrawals of money from the company 
account. In doing so, the executive not only avoids detection for the initial 
crime, but he also increases the end-of-year bonus that the company will 
pay him for bringing in additional business. In other words, the action that 
the executive takes to avoid detection exerts an additional cost on the 
 
 
 95. For an introduction to the now-voluminous literature on how government actors shape norms, 
see generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). 
For application in the criminal law context, see Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic 
Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1255–63 (2000); 
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 487–88 (1999).  
 96. See Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 
20 (2008) (explaining that conspicuous enforcement can reduce putative securities fraud victims‘ 
perceived risk of harm).  
 97. See Sanchirico, supra note 90, at 1336.  













victim company, but does not reduce the profitability of his criminal 
conduct, at least not in the short run.
99
  
In sum, for a certain class of wrongdoers, conspicuous enforcement 
does not deter. Instead, it perversely increases the wrongdoer‘s 
effectiveness. Therefore, to improve deterrence and avoid the costs of 
cover-ups and intensified harm, the government must use less observable 
measures to increase its enforcement and the corresponding likelihood of 
detection.
100
 A stealthy increase in enforcement means that the 
government increases its ability to apprehend and punish, but does so 
without announcing the increase to the general public. A stealthy 
enforcement regime incapacitates unsuspecting wrongdoers, but does not 
deter.
101
 Incapacitation, however, may be better than nothing.
102
  
Of course, stealth has its drawbacks. Purely unobserved surveillance 
fails to deter potential criminals since they have no idea that they face 
increased detection or punishment. Stealthy policing also fails to signal 
innocents that society views as a priority the eradication and punishment 
of certain conduct. If society mistakenly infers stealth enforcement as a 
lack of interest, social norms are weakened. More people may commit 
crimes (or fail to report them) simply because they assume no one cares. 
Stealth also exerts a number of collateral costs, such as increased potential 
for abuse of power and corruption within government agencies. It also 




For many of the reasons discussed above, the government and society 
should prefer a strategy that flexibly combines transparency and stealth.
104
 
In many instances, we will expect the government to announce that it is 
 
 
 99. Over time, however, the cover-up may increase the offender‘s risk of detection and 
punishment, particularly if the government chooses to prosecute him for additional ―process‖ oriented 
crimes such as perjury or obstruction of justice. See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, 
Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1444 (2009).  
 100. Dru Stevenson makes a similar argument for uncertain application of substantive statutes. 
Stevenson, supra note 58, at 1574–77.  
 101. Society benefits when the costs of incapacitating the criminal (prison costs plus opportunity 
costs of lost contributions to society) are outweighed by the harm he would impose in a given period. 
See Hugo M. Mialon & Paul H. Rubin, The Economics of the Bill of Rights, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
1, 41–42 (2008) (citing Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 107, 
107–10 (1987)). 
 102. Of course, the stealth strategy has a number of collateral costs, the most important being the 
fact that the government may become unaccountable and abuse its power. Stevenson, supra note 58, at 
1578–79. 
 103. See generally McAdams, supra note 27 (citing abuses in undercover stings).  
 104. For a discussion of the tradeoffs between transparency and stealth in undercover 
investigations, see Hay, supra note 78, at 411–12.  












increasing its enforcement of certain laws, but we will also expect the 
government not to describe in specific detail how it plans to detect or 
apprehend such conduct. We will require the government to explain and 
document what it has done ex post (at trial or during a hearing, for 
example) without foreclosing its ability to use similar techniques ex ante. 
The optimal combination of stealth and transparency will be one that (a) 
deters putative wrongdoers who fear marginal increases in detection and 
sanctions, (b) fosters and supports law-abiding social norms, but (c) does 
not provide a detection-avoidance road map to wrongdoers who are intent 
on accomplishing or maintaining a given course of harmful conduct.  
Arguably, cooperation provides just that mix. The public knows as a 
general rule that cooperators exist and that they may help the government 
by attending and recording meetings with other criminals ex ante, or by 
testifying against them at trial ex post. The public also knows that the 
government is committing resources to the reduction of crime, signaling 
not only its existence but also society‘s disapproval of such conduct.  
At the same time, absent some sleuthing, a document trail, and the 
ability to predict the future, the public often will not know the identity of 
specific cooperators.
105
 Those who can be deterred will be impressed by 
the government‘s use of snitches ex ante and by the possibility that any of 
their friends might ―flip‖ ex post. Those who cannot or will not be 
deterred will be apprehended when one of their colleagues flips. Whatever 
its drawbacks, cooperation‘s mix of transparent and unobserved policing 
improves the government‘s ability to deter and incapacitate offenders.  
C. Some Limitations on the Detection Effect 
Until now, I have explored the various benefits of cooperation, 
particularly as they relate to the government‘s ability to detect and deter 
wrongdoing. Certain aspects of cooperation, however, reduce the net 
Detection Effect, including (a) potential abuse of cooperation and 
cooperators and (b) problems associated with the value and use of the 
cooperator‘s information.  
 
 
 105. Criminals cannot predict which associates eventually will cooperate, and the government 
may mask the identity of cooperators. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the 
Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
921, 956–61 (2009) (describing how availability of cooperation agreements on internet has fueled 













1. Government Abuse 
Cooperation‘s net Detection Effect falls insofar as government agents 
abuse the tool in a manner that causes them to detect, prosecute, or convict 
fewer offenders.  
If the cooperating defendant forfeits viable procedural claims in the 
course of seeking a cooperation agreement, cooperation permits 
prosecutors and law enforcement agents to ignore procedural obligations 
under the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. In that sense, cooperation is no 
different from the standard-issue plea agreement.
106
 Prosecutors and agents 
will become less vigilant and cease monitoring each other
107
 when they 
rely on cooperation as a means of encouraging defendants to refrain from 
filing motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence. The failure to 
follow procedural rules, moreover, may undermine law enforcement‘s 
legitimacy, force prosecutors to enter into agreements with suboptimal 
cooperators, and increase the overall likelihood of unchecked corruption 
and abuse within law enforcement agencies, all of which may lead to an 




A second possibility is that prosecutors and agents may use cooperators 
prospectively to apprehend offenders who never would have committed 
crimes in the first place, or who would have committed less serious crimes 
but for the cooperator‘s urging.
109
 This result is problematic, particularly if 
it reduces the legitimacy of law enforcement institutions or decreases the 
opportunity costs of engaging in criminal conduct.
110
 That is, if would-be 
offenders conclude that they will be prosecuted regardless of whether they 
 
 
 106. ―[G]uilty pleas avoid most of the potentially costly requirements that criminal procedure 
imposes.‖ William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997). 
 107. Cf. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 794–95 (2003) (arguing for institutional structures that promote ―mutual 
monitoring‖ by federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents).  
 108. For a sophisticated analysis of how criminal procedure rules prevent law enforcement actors 
from engaging in rent-seeking behavior and corruption, see Keith N. Hylton and Vikramaditya 
Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61 (2007). 
 109. McAdams terms this the ―false offender‖ problem. McAdams, supra note 27, at 128.  
 110. McAdams observes that imprisoning false offenders could temporarily increase general 
deterrence when aimed at a new population because it publicizes a new tactic. Id. at 128–29. As that 
population becomes aware of the tactic, deterrence should drop back to normal levels, id., and indeed 
could drop even further if criminals become convinced that the opportunity costs of engaging in 
criminal conduct have decreased since innocent activity might result in a false conviction. See also 
Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 89 
(2008). 












are guilty, the ―missed opportunity‖ to make money legitimately will 
become less valuable.  
The specter of government abuse certainly should not be ignored. It is 
unclear, however, how much abuse cooperation generates in addition or 
comparison to other policing techniques. Moreover, it would be an 
overstatement to say that cooperation offers the government a free pass to 
ignore the law. Reputation costs, media scrutiny, professional mores, and 
the possibility that some defendants might indeed decide to take their 
chances with a trial, all combine to lessen the risks of at least some of 
these abuses.  
In sum, we know that abuse and corruption reduce cooperation‘s 
Detection Effect, but we do not know by how much. The answer likely 
depends on the context in which cooperation occurs and the structural 
mechanisms already in place regarding government abuse. Departments 
that stress ethical conduct and tolerate little abuse should also tolerate little 
abuse with regard to cooperation. Lax departments, by contrast, will use 
cooperation inappropriately and thereby destroy its Detection Effect.  
2. Inaccurate and False Information 
Even when government actors act in good faith, they nevertheless may 
find themselves acting on inaccurate or false information. To prevent this 
from occurring, prosecutors and government agents must spend a fair 
amount of time extracting and sifting information. They also must develop 
organizational mechanisms to maintain and use such information 
effectively. These tools are themselves costly and therefore reduce the 
Detection Benefit of cooperation.  
I address each of these problems below. They will vary depending on 
the type of crime and the manner by which the government uses the 
cooperator: prospectively, to make new cases, or historically, to prove old 
ones. Although the government can take steps to minimize inaccuracies 
and falsehoods, these steps, too, are costly. Accordingly, information costs 
always exert a downward drag on the Detection Effect. 
a. Unintentionally Inaccurate Information 
Cooperators unintentionally may provide inaccurate information by 
jumping to conclusions, relying on a faulty memory, or accepting 
prosecutorial theories because of their desire to secure an agreement. 

















Even worse, government interrogators themselves may introduce a 
certain amount of inaccuracy into the cooperation process by asking 
unduly suggestive questions or encouraging cooperating defendants to 
make conclusions that are not necessarily correct.
112
  
These problems can be overcome or at least mitigated. Training can 
help prosecutors and government agents become more adept at flagging 
and screening out inaccuracies. Interrogators can ask more open-ended 
questions during proffer sessions and seek additional corroboration from 
alternate sources to avoid situations in which cooperating defendants 
simply echo what they think prosecutors want to hear.
113
 Moreover, 
prospective use of cooperators (to arrange meetings with co-defendants 
and undercover agents, for example), rather than historical use (recounting 
a two-year-old conversation), reduces the potential for inaccuracy.  
Despite these efforts, inaccurate information infects the cooperation 
process. Therefore, the inaccuracies themselves, as well as the efforts the 
government takes to avoid them, all exert a downward drag on the 
Detection Effect.  
b. Information Overload and Agency Costs 
Even when it receives accurate information, the government may not 
use it effectively. For example, the government may find itself overloaded 





 111. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 
37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994). 
 112. Insofar as a defendant‘s guilt turns on statements made during conversations with 
cooperators, the risk for inaccuracies may be greater. See, e.g., Steven B. Duke, Ann Seung-Eun Lee & 
Chet K.W. Pager, A Picture‟s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational Versus Eyewitness Testimony 
in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007) (explaining why testimony about prior 
conversations might be inaccurate). 
 113. Daniel Richman suggests as much in his discussion of how a prosecutor might pressure a 
cooperating defendant to tell the truth without causing the cooperator to say whatever the prosecutor 
wishes to hear: 
 Consider the skilled and ethical prosecutor. When a defendant comes in saying he wants 
to cooperate, the prosecutor does not tell the defendant what she‘s looking for. Nor does she 
sit passively when the defendant‘s first tale minimizes not just his own culpability but that of 
his friends. She won‘t throw him out of the room . . . . She‘ll confront him, trying to walk the 
fine line between showing the defendant that she can tell when he‘s lying (good) and giving 
the defendant a road map of what he needs to say to make the government happy (bad). 
Daniel Richman, Expanding the Evidentiary Frame for Cooperating Witnesses, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
893, 893–94 (2002). 
 114. For a discussion of ―information overload‖ and how it may affect the government‘s effective 












Matthew Bodie observes in other contexts, an excess of information can 
become ―the equivalent of no information‖ or it can ―drown out 
information that would otherwise be accessible.‖
115
 Although technology 
may ease the government‘s ability to use and retain the information, such 
technology is not costless.
116
 Someone must choose, test, train, and 
monitor others in implementing and using such technology.  
In other cases, information may become lost or underutilized due to the 
agency costs associated with its distribution.
117
 A single drug conspiracy 
can be prosecuted by either a federal prosecutor in conjunction with the 
DEA or FBI, a local district attorney in connection with a city police 
force‘s narcotics bureau, or by some joint federal-local task force.
118
 Each 
of those agencies may have incentives to hoard information they receive 
about that conspiracy in order to retain control over the investigation and 
the attendant conviction and arrest statistics that accompany it.
119
 
Moreover, even a wholly federal crime can trigger venue in two or more 
jurisdictions. As a result, multiple federal components will compete for 
control over the same case. Competition, in turn, fuels turf wars
120
 and 





use of information, see generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 470 (2003). See also Michael Levi & 
Peter Reuter, Money Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289, 301 (2006) (raising information overload 
concerns in the context of money laundering enforcement); Chad M. Oldfather, Heuristics, Biases, and 
Criminal Defendants, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 249, 261 (2007) (voicing concern that information overload 
could infect the plea bargaining process in response to increased disclosure requirements). 
 115. Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 
72 (2008). 
 116. For example, the United States Attorney‘s Office for the Southern District of New York 
implemented a cooperator mapping system that tracked, among other things, cooperators who might 
have information about violent crimes. See James B. Jacobs, Legal and Political Impediments to 
Lethal Violence Policy, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1099, 1110 & n.33 (1998) (citing mapping system). Such 
systems, however, cost money to build, maintain, and improve.  
 117. For an example of this dynamic in the private sector, see Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, 
Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. 231 (2004) (describing reasons 
why private competitors may decline to share information). Although Aviram and Tor focus on 
information-sharing failures in the private sector, portions of their analysis should also apply to 
government agencies (and offices within a single government agency) that compete for scarce 
resources. 
 118. This flexibility stems from the extent of overlap between federal and state criminal statutes. 
―In 1997, only about 5% of all federal criminal cases involved federal statutes with no local or state 
counterpart . . . .‖ Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: 
A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 244 (2005) (citations 
omitted). 
 119. Admittedly, each jurisdiction can file charges if at least one of their elements sufficiently 
differ from each other. See generally Blockburger v. United States, 248 U.S. 299 (1931) (analyzing 
double jeopardy claim by comparing elements of charged offenses). Only one agency, however, can be 
the first to file charges and capture the attendant benefits that accompany that position.  













The information pathologies discussed above are not necessarily 
intractable.
122
 They may be reduced when agencies form reciprocal 
relationships with each other,
123
 encourage the growth of information-
sharing norms,
124
 enact formal protocols
125
 (and increase information 
technology capability) for distributing cases and sharing information,
126
 
and create joint investigatory bodies such as local and regional task 
forces.
127
 These strategies, however, are unevenly implemented, costly to 
enact and monitor, and prone to error and defection. Accordingly, when 
the interests of an agency, division, or individual prosecutor or law 
enforcement agent diverge from the interests of society, some information 
withholding will occur despite cultural norms or more formal protocols 
that encourage or demand sharing.  
 
 
& JUST. 377, 405 (2006) (describing history of ―turf battles‖ between law enforcement agencies).  
 121. Aviram & Tor, supra note 117, at 238 (explaining how fears of free riding cause competitors 
to underproduce and withhold information from others). Since cooperation provides so many benefits 
to prosecutors, the underproduction of information is not likely a concern here. By contrast, the 
sharing of information may well be a concern when multiple agencies and units can generate the same 
set of arrests and convictions, albeit with differing levels of effort and success. Instead of flowing to 
the agency or agent who can best utilize it, information will remain stuck with the agent or prosecutor 
who first elicits it.  
 122. Nor will they always exist. In some instances, for example, a well-regarded agency or 
prosecutor may share a cooperator‘s information either because she lacks the jurisdiction, time, or 
interest in developing the case. The point here is that some residual amount of withholding will exist, 
and thereby drive down the Detection Effect.  
 123. Aviram & Tor, supra note 117, at 241.  
 124. In August 2008, the FBI published a National Information Sharing Strategy that urged a 
―sharing‖ culture over a ―need to know‖ approach to information between and within law enforcement 
agencies. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY (2008), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-information-sharing-strategy-1/ 
national-information-sharing-strategy-2008-pdf.  
 125. For an in-depth discussion of a number of programs designed to increase cooperation 
between federal and state law enforcement agents and prosecutors, see Miller & Eisenstein, supra note 
118. 
 126. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which, among other things, directed the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to revamp its information sharing capabilities with federal and state 
enforcement agencies. In 2005, the DOJ announced the Law Enforcement Information Sharing 
Program (LEISP), which created a ―OneDOJ‖ network designed to share information. Although 
IRTPA was designed to address terrorism concerns, LEISP is designed to enable information sharing 
in the broader context of general criminal law enforcement. See Current Awareness: From the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation: FBI Announces Contract Award in Information Sharing Program, 7 
CYBERCRIME L. REP.  (Thomson West, Rochester, N.Y.), Mar. 6, 2007, at 4; U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
Law Enforcement Information Sharing Program, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ocio/projects.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2011). The FBI‘s Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS), also 
maintains a number of programs designed to encourage the sharing of information between law 
enforcement agencies. See Criminal Justice Information Services, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  
 127. See Richman, supra note 120, at 406 (discussing ways in which joint task forces and informal 
personal relationships reduce organizational costs).  












Thus, even when cooperators provide useful and accurate information, 
there is no guarantee that the information will be transmitted efficiently to 
the person or persons who can best use it. The agency costs of information 
sharing, in turn, drag down the Detection Effect.  
c. Cooperator Lies 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, cooperators may lie.
128
 They 
certainly have ample incentive to do so; a potentially massive reduction in 
sentence is at stake.
129
 Although cooperators can lie about any number of 
matters, I will discuss those that fall within the following categories: (a) 
attempts by the cooperator to minimize his culpability for conduct with 
which he has been charged; (b) omissions of information about the 
cooperator‘s prior criminal conduct; and (c) lies that falsely implicate 
others. 
  i. Minimization Lies 
The first category, so-called ―minimization lies,‖ undermines the 
Detection Effect of cooperation because it enables the cooperating 
defendant to avoid taking full responsibility for the already-charged crime. 
Imagine the government arrests several public employees with embezzling 
money from the public agency that employs them. The accompanying 
complaint charges that Employee A stole in excess of $100,000 from the 
agency. During a subsequent proffer in which she seeks a cooperation 
agreement, Employee A contends that she stole only $10,000, but she 
offers her cooperation in prosecuting her four co-conspirators. Since 
Employee A stole less money than some of her co-conspirators (assuming 
she is telling the truth), the prosecutor chooses Employee A as the 
government‘s cooperator. 
If Employee A is lying and the government accepts her word and enters 
a cooperation agreement with her, the government prosecutor will tell the 
judge at sentencing that Employee A embezzled only $10,000. Not only 
will Employee A receive the benefit of a cooperation designation, but she 
 
 
 128. Numerous scholars have discussed this problem. For one of the most recent treatments of the 
issue, see Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not 
Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 
6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519 (2009). 
 129. ―[T]he temptation to lie in cooperation agreement cases is not just a natural feature of the 
landscape but specifically is introduced or inflated by the government when it offers immunity or 













will also start out with a lower baseline sentence due to the government‘s 
acceptance of her claim that she stole less money. In other words, 
Employee A‘s minimization improves her chances of obtaining a 
cooperation agreement and reduces the baseline sentence from which the 
court applies its cooperation discount.  
Employee A‘s conduct implicates the Detection Effect because 
Employee A‘s lies cause the government to detect less crime by the 
defendant. Now, assuming for a moment that Employee A is lying only 
about her own conduct but is truthful about everyone else‘s, it may be that 
Employee A‘s lies are overcome by the government‘s increased ability to 
prosecute her co-workers. Nevertheless, minimization lies detract from 
whatever additional detection ability the government gains as a result of 
the defendant‘s cooperation.  
Of course, prosecutors and agents realize that Employee A maintains 
strong incentives to minimize her culpability. So do the other employees‘ 
defense attorneys, who will fiercely cross-examine Employee A should 
any of her co-workers decide to take their chances at trial. For these 
reasons, prosecutors will have no choice but to test Employee A‘s 
minimization claims. They can interview Employee A multiple times to 
examine her story‘s internal logic; seek independent means of 
corroboration through documents, wiretaps, or other forensic evidence; 
and interview additional witnesses and other would-be cooperators to test 
Employee A‘s claims (with the caveat that they, too, may lie).
130
  
After such a process, the government either will convince itself that 
Employee A is telling the truth or that Employee A has lied. If the 
government concludes that Employee A is telling the truth, the 
prosecutor‘s attempt to corroborate Employee A‘s story still constitutes a 
drag on the Detection Effect because the effort itself is costly. If, on the 
other hand, the government concludes that Employee A has lied, it either 
will charge Employee A with obstruction of justice or force Employee A to 
accept a quick guilty plea on the original charges.  
In sum, the government can, and likely will, take steps to filter truthful 
minimization claims from false ones.
131
 The mere fact of such filtering 
should deter some would-be cooperators from lying. However, a number 
 
 
 130. For discussions of how and how often prosecutors attempt to corroborate cooperator claims, 
see Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 932.  
 131. ―[P]rosecutors assume . . . that defendants tend to minimize their role in and respobsility for 
criminal conduct, and that they tend to exculpate friends and allies and implicate rivals and 
adversaries.‖ Cohen, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing that prosecutors make efforts to prevent 
minimization). 












of defendants will lie anyway. Filtering thus remains essential, both to 
make the threat of corroboration credible, and to avoid meltdowns in the 
cases that do proceed to trial.
132
 
Nevertheless, filtering imposes costs, and in a world where potential 
cooperators are plentiful, rational prosecutors should prefer the 
cooperators who impose the fewest costs. Accordingly, when cooperators 
are fungible and the government has a plentiful supply of them, 
minimization lies are unlikely to affect the Detection Effect because the 
government will be loath to choose cooperators who deny engaging in the 
scope of conduct with which they have already been charged.  
 ii. Criminal History Lies 
In some federal judicial districts, most notably the Southern District of 
New York, the federal prosecutor‘s office requires cooperating defendants 
not only to admit their responsibility for charged conduct, but also to 
disclose all prior criminal conduct and plead to the most serious crimes 
among the charged and uncharged conduct.
133
 Cooperator defendants in 
the Southern District therefore may find themselves pleading guilty to 
charges of which the government was previously unaware prior to the 
initiation of the cooperation process. To retain cooperation‘s palatability, 
the United States Attorneys‘ Office specifies at sentencing which charges 
came about solely as a result of the cooperator‘s own admission, and 




Just as cooperators have incentives to minimize their charged conduct, 
they also have incentives to omit certain details of their criminal history. 
If, as a general rule, juries prefer likeable cooperators, prosecutors will 
choose defendants who have engaged in less serious wrongdoing in the 
past. Defendants therefore may omit details about prior crimes of which 
 
 
 132. The pooling problem discussed above is a variant of problems that arise in the interrogation 
of suspected criminals. A robust right to remain silent theoretically allows innocents to separate 
themselves from guilty defendants who would otherwise lie, see Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The 
Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000), but guilty offenders may be so optimistic about their ability to 
hoodwink government agents that they submit to interrogation anyway. See Stephanos Bibas, The 
Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421, 426–31 (2003) (detailing 
suspects‘ multiple incentives to lie).  
 133. Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 928.  














the government is completely unaware.
135
 Moreover, defendants may omit 
information about prior crimes if they committed them with friends or 
family members and fear that the government will prosecute those friends 
or family members, or seek the fruits of said crimes.
136
  
Criminal history lies do not exert the same downward drag on the 
Detection Effect as minimization lies because they do not place the 
government in a worse position than if the defendant declined to 
cooperate. Returning to the example of Employee A, she might confess her 
involvement in the charged crime (i.e., that she stole $100,000), but 
decline to tell the government about a separate fraud that took place three 
years ago, but which has not been brought to any government agent‘s 
attention. In the earlier minimization scenario, the government charges 
Employee A with stealing $100,000 and she successfully (and willfully) 
convinces the prosecutor that she stole only $10,000; the employee 
therefore receives both the benefits of cooperation and a lesser baseline 
sentence. In the current scenario, Employee A receives the benefit of 
cooperation, but, because she takes responsibility for the full $100,000 
loss, she starts with the same baseline sentence she would have received 
had there been no cooperation agreement. Since the government would 
have had no knowledge of the prior criminal conduct anyway, it is made 
no worse off by the defendant‘s lies about her criminal history. 
The caveat to the foregoing is that the government will be made worse 
off if Employee A testifies against a coconspirator at trial and one of the 
other defense attorneys learns about the prior conduct and successfully 
cross-examines her.
137
 In that instance, the government‘s case against 
Employees B, C, D, and E may very well fall apart. Then again, trials are 
scarce in the federal criminal system, and prosecutors often control the 
flow of information undermining their witnesses‘ own credibility.
138
  
Moreover, if the government is smart, it may use the cooperator in such 
a way that the cooperator need never testify. For example, assume that the 
government approached Employee A before any legal proceeding had ever 
 
 
 135. Moreover, defendants may have incentives to omit prior crimes insofar as they continue to 
benefit and use the fruits of those crimes.  
 136. Supra note 131. 
 137. See Rasmusen, supra note 7, at 1566 (quoting Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for 
Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1429 (1996) (observing that 
government‘s cases can be substantially damaged by witnesses whose credibility has been successfully 
challenged at trial)).  
 138. If the cooperator testifies as a witness against another defendant, the government is obligated 
to disclose the cooperator‘s criminal history so that he may be cross-examined by the defense. Giglio 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972).  












been brought against the other targets. Admitting her crime, Employee A 
agrees to cooperate with the government and wears an undercover wire to 
a meeting with Employees B, C, D, and E. Since B, C, D, and E have yet 
to be charged with any criminal misconduct, Employee A‘s undercover 
wire is beyond the boundaries of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.
139
 During the meeting, B, C, D, and E all make 
incriminating statements about the conspiracy. Even if Employee A‘s 
criminal history lies come to light as the case progresses, the government 
can avoid Employee A‘s testimony and instead rely on the taped 
conversations in the unlikely event any of the remaining employees 
choose to go to trial.  
For all these reasons, we should expect the government to address the 
specter of criminal history lies by minimizing its own reliance on a single 
cooperator‘s testimony. Not surprisingly, this is exactly what Ellen 
Yaroshefsky found when she interviewed former prosecutors in the 
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York regarding their strategies for 
using cooperating defendants.
140
 If cooperator lies are costly, then 
prosecutors seem to be at least aware of this risk and appear to be taking 
precautions to reduce them.  
 iii. Lies About Others 
Finally, cooperators may lie about others, either by implicating 
innocents, exaggerating the culpability of other criminals, or attempting to 
minimize the culpability of others.
141
  
The prosecution and sanctioning of persons for crimes they did not 
commit reduces the government‘s accuracy in enforcement. A reduction in 
accurate arrests, however, is not equivalent to a reduction in the Detection 
Effect, because that effect is based on the government‘s perceived ability 
to identify and prosecute wrongdoers. Accordingly, the cooperator-fueled 





 139. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296–300 (1990) (Fifth Amendment inapplicable to 
defendant‘s undercover discussion with government agent); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 
(1971) (informant‘s covert taping of conversation does not implicate Fourth Amendment). If the 
defendant has been indicted, an undercover agent or cooperator‘s attempt to elicit information from the 
defendant about the indicted offense violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 140. Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 923–33.  
 141. The above analysis considers each category singularly. When cooperators employ 
combinations of lies, the difficulty in filtering increases substantially. 
 142. Putative criminals, however, may be less convinced by cooperator-fueled prosecutions since 













sincerely believes that such individuals are guilty, particularly if those 
individuals enter guilty pleas. Putting aside our moral revulsion, the 




Nevertheless, inflating convictions inaccurately is not a very smart 
policy in the long run.
144
 Isacchar Rosen-Zvi and Talia Fisher aptly 
summarize: 
[W]rongful convictions waste limited resources and instigate 
underparticipation in lawful and socially beneficial activity. 
Moreover, exposure to the risk of wrongful conviction impairs 
deterrence, since it lowers the marginal cost of choosing to engage 
in criminal behavior; when innocent people are systematically 
exposed to the risk of criminal sanctions, the price of criminal 
activity becomes cheaper in relation to noncriminal activity.
145
 
Although the above account is largely theoretical, the well-publicized fruit 
of now-ubiquitous ―innocence projects‖ supports the theory.
146
 Over the 
last two decades, numerous well-publicized DNA-fueled exonerations 
have demonstrated the innocence of over two hundred state and federal 
criminal offenders, many of whom were convicted with the assistance of 
cooperating defendants, informants, and jailhouse snitches.
147
 Innocence 
findings, reported prominently in multiple media outlets, can undermine 
the law enforcement system‘s overall credibility, thereby reducing 




Here again, the nature of the cooperation itself will impact the 
government‘s willingness and ability to offer a cooperation agreement. For 
prospective cooperators (that is, defendants who assist the government in 
 
 
the ability to lie.  
 143. But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 1321 (2003) (arguing that rules intended to avoid conviction of innocents is based in efficiency, 
as well as morality, concerns).  
 144. ―[A]ccuracy and enforcement effort are substitute means of increasing deterrence . . . .‖ 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 111, at 3.  
 145. Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 110, at 89 (footnotes omitted).  
 146. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56–58 (2008) (tracking 
growth of innocence movement and state and federal responses). 
 147. Id. (providing a rigorous analysis of the causes and treatment of the first 200 exonerated 
prisoners as compared to a control group).  
 148. Prosecutors understand this dynamic. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 821–25 (discussing the 
process of testing cooperator‘s credibility based on past experiences as a federal prosecutor); 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 932–33 (recounting interviews in which prosecutors stressed the 
importance of corroborating cooperators‘ claims). 












future cases), the undercover investigation itself will provide some of the 
corroboration for the cooperator‘s claim.
149
 If Stacy contends that Bob 
sells Ecstasy at the local night club, then the government will corroborate 
Stacy‘s claim when Stacy visits the club wearing a body wire and, with 
undercover agents nearby, purchases Ecstasy from Bob. Thus, Stacy has 
very little incentive to implicate purely innocent actors. 
Of course, the issue may not be so simple. Stacy might encourage Bob, 
a local Ecstasy dealer, to agree to distribute far more Ecstasy than he 
normally would. Stacy need not be an evil person to bring this event about. 
If Stacy perceives her own sentence as being tied to the dangerousness of 
the offender she helps prosecute, she will have every reason in the world 
to urge Bob to increase his distribution. Assuming Bob is already 
predisposed to sell Ecstasy, Stacy‘s manipulation will not likely affect a 
jury‘s determination of guilt at trial, and may not even trigger a very 
strong claim for a reduced sentence, although a few courts have 
recognized a limited ―sentencing entrapment‖ defense for defendants who 
contend they were persuaded by government agents to engage in more 
harm than they otherwise intended.
150
  
Does Bob‘s excessive sentence reduce the Detection Effect of 
cooperation? Possibly. If the government allocates too many resources 
toward the apprehension and incarceration of criminals like Bob (what 
some might call ―low hanging fruit‖), it may fail to deter more serious 
offenders. In fact, cooperation of this type may cause us to reduce the 
number of aggregate offenders, while clearing the field for the most 
aggressive and dangerous offenders.
151
  
Finally, if we are worried about a cooperator‘s manipulation when she 
provides ―prospective‖ assistance (by arranging undercover buys and 
taping her conversations with others, for example), then we should be even 
more concerned when her assistance is primarily ―historical.‖ A historical 
case is one in which the cooperator solely assists with solving a crime that 
has occurred in the past. Because the cooperator is retelling facts, it is far 
 
 
 149. Cf. Cohen, supra note 1, at 822 (―[I]t is not too difficult to determine if a defendant is being 
truthful about his illicit conversations with his confederates when the defendant and his confederates 
have been the subject of an extensive wiretap investigation spanning months and including hundreds 
of telephone calls.‖). 
 150. See, e.g., Jess D. Mekeel, Note, Misnamed, Misapplied, and Misguided: Clarifying the State 
of Sentence Entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the Doctrine, 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1583 (2006).  













more difficult to corroborate her story—except by obtaining testimony 
from other witnesses, many of whom will likely be co-defendants.
152
  
Admittedly, this may be less of a problem in cases that are dominated 
by emails and written documents.
153
 Nevertheless, documents often fail to 
speak for themselves, and cooperators can provide crucial interpretations 
for ambiguous statements. For all these reasons, prosecutors will find it 
necessary to corroborate historical cooperator testimony with other 
cooperator testimony. In other words, in the historical context, the 
government needs several cooperating defendants to demonstrate that the 
single cooperator‘s story is in fact truthful. Historical cooperation 
therefore increases the amount of time the government must spend 
working on the same case, as well as the number of defendants to whom it 
must extend potentially sentence-reducing agreements. For all of these 
reasons, we should expect the government to rely on historical cooperation 
primarily in the most serious and difficult-to-prosecute cases: massive 
corporate frauds, particularly violent gangs, or similarly dangerous 
organized crime outfits.  
In sum, there are a number of ways in which bad information can drag 
down the Detection Effect. The question, then, is whether prosecutors and 
investigators adequately mitigate them. We do not know the answer, but 
we do know that these costs are not monitored in any rigorous or 
systematic way. Moreover, we also know that societal costs, even when 
they are perceived correctly, are not necessarily internalized evenly or 
completely by government actors.
154
 For all these reasons, then, we should 
be worried that cooperation‘s Detection Effect is not quite as robust as we 
assume it to be. 
D. Conclusion 
Cooperation improves the government‘s ability to detect and prosecute 
crime, but with certain limitations. Agents and prosecutors may elicit 
incorrect information, or improperly handle information that is otherwise 
accurate and useful. Cooperators may lie, either about themselves or about 
others. All of these problems place limitations on the Detection Effect. 
Certainly, these drawbacks can be mitigated by internal training and 
 
 
 152. Yaroshefsky‘s subjects discuss exactly this type of problem. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, 
at 938–39.  
 153. I am grateful to Professor Jennifer Arlen for pointing this out.  
 154. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 












monitoring, and with stronger efforts to corroborate cooperator claims. 
Many prosecutors and agents would say that is exactly what they do.
155
 
Nevertheless, these efforts themselves are costly and therefore reduce the 
benefits of cooperation. They may become even more important when one 
considers cooperation‘s greater problem, the Sanction Effect. 
III. THE SANCTION EFFECT OF COOPERATION 
The Detection Effect describes only one half of cooperation‘s effect on 
deterrence. Cooperation also alters the punishment that the defendant 
reasonably expects in the event he is apprehended.
156
 This is the Sanction 
Effect of cooperation, and it has been ignored for too long. 
When the government ―pays‖ the defendant for his assistance by 
reducing his sentence, cooperation reduces the expected sanction for a 
given crime, notwithstanding the fact that it also increases the probability 
of detection. The question, then, is whether and how the reduction in 
sanction (the Sanction Effect) interacts with the increase in probability of 
detection (the Detection Effect). The answer to this question will depend, 
in part, on three factors: (a) how broadly the government extends 
cooperation agreements; (b) how deeply judges impose cooperation 
discounts; and (c) how optimistically criminals perceive the likelihood of 
an agreement and discount. After reviewing the fairly sparse information 
that the government publishes on cooperation, this Part takes up each of 
these issues in turn. 
A. Background on Cooperator Sentencing 
In 2008, federal prosecutors filed substantial assistance motions in 
approximately 13.5% of the cases sentenced that year.
157
 A majority of 
those cooperators were defendants who had been charged with drug 
trafficking offenses.
158
 In the same year, fraud defendants made up another 
10–11% of the cooperating population. Defendants charged with firearm 
offenses, previously just 3% of the cooperation workforce, took up another 
 
 
 155. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 932.  
 156. By using the term ―expected sanction‖ in this section, I am not referring to the overall 
expected punishment. Instead, I am referring only to the defendant‘s expectation as to what sentence 
the judge will impose on the defendant in the event she is caught and successfully prosecuted.  
 157. 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.16, tbl.N. 
 158. 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.30 (showing that drug trafficking cases were clearly 
more than 50% of overall 5K1.1 cases). For more on why drug traffickers overwhelmingly seek 
cooperation agreements, see Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and 















 The remaining cooperators were distributed among a variety of 




5K1.1 Sentences as a Percentage of the Overall Sentencing Pool         
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004161 2005162 2006 2007 2008 
5K1.1 Sentences163 9,788 9,754 9,390 10,203 10,360 9,909 10,099 10,139 10,049 10,048 
All Reported Sentences164 52,425 54,617 54,851 58,684 65,171 65,043 68,850 70,187 69,893 74,493 
Cooperator Percentage 18.7% 17.9% 17.1% 17.4% 15.9% 15.2% 14.7% 14.4% 14.4% 13.5% 
 
Although the absolute number of cooperators has remained relatively 
constant, the percentage of cooperating defendants has declined somewhat 
from 18.7% in 1999 to 13.5% in 2008.
165
  
Several factors might explain a declining cooperator percentage. The 
government‘s ―offense pool‖ may increasingly include crimes for which 
cooperation is little to no help. The government also may have become a 
more efficient consumer of cooperation, learning to convict more 
defendants with the same number of cooperators.  
Finally, and perhaps most plausibly, it may be that the numbers are 
simply more truthful than they used to be, now that the Guidelines ranges 
are advisory.
166
 Whereas previously, attorneys might have masked other 
 
 
 159. See 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.30. In 1999, out of 8937 documented 
cooperation cases, prosecutors filed 5K1.1 letters in just 260 firearms cases. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at tbl.30 (1999), http://ftp.ussc.gov/ 
ANNRPT/1999/SBTOC.htm [hereinafter 1999 SOURCEBOOK]. 
 160. Figure 1 was compiled using statistics from Table 26 and Table 26A of the U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at tbl.26 (1999–2003, 2006–2008), 
tbl.26A (2003–2005), http://ftp.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].  
 161. The first two figures in this column were calculated by adding the relevant data contained in 
the Pre- and Post-Blakely versions of Table 26A. The percentage was then calculated using the two 
absolute figures. 
 162. The first two figures in this column were calculated by adding the relevant data contained in 
the Pre- and Post-Booker versions of Tables 26 and 26A for 2005. The percentage was then calculated 
using the two absolute figures. 
 163. Figures in this row have been taken from Tables 26 and 26A (for years 2003–2005) for each 
year of the Sentencing Commission‘s annual Sourcebook of Statistics. 
 164. Id. Note that the actual number of sentenced defendants is greater, but that the Sentencing 
Commission excludes from its calculations cases that lack sufficient information. See, e.g., 2008 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.26, tbl.26A (1999–2008). 
 165. Compare ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 160, at app. B, National Data, with ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 160, at tbl.N. Caren Myers Morrison contends that these statistics provide an incomplete 
picture of cooperation. See Morrison, supra note 105, at 936.  
 166. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 509 (arguing that Section 5K1.1 ―almost invites 












forms of leniency as cooperation, they no longer have the incentive or 
need to do so.  
The discount that cooperators receive for their assistance also has 
declined, albeit slightly and in varying amounts according to the charged 
crime.
167
 Whereas fraud defendants have experienced a significant 
reduction in median discount (from 100% to 70% discounts),
168
 drug 
traffickers receive more or less the same discount as they always did: 50% 
of the lowest applicable recommended Guideline sentence.
169
  
Although the nationwide percentage of cooperators has inched 
downward steadily between 1999 and 2008, the reduction has been 
distributed across districts quite unevenly. Between 1999 and 2008, the 
Second Circuit, which includes federal prosecutions in New York and 
Connecticut, experienced a modest drop of cooperators from 
approximately 23% of all defendants sentenced in 1999 to a little more 
than 21% in 2008.
170
 By contrast, during the same time period, the 
percentage of Eighth Circuit cooperating defendants dropped by nearly 
half,
171





prosecutors to treat substantial assistance as a vehicle for discretionary plea negotiation benefits‖). 
Nagel and Schulhofer‘s 1992 article cited evidence that some prosecutors were in fact using Section 
5K1.1 as a means of smoothing otherwise rigid Guideline ranges. Id. at 522. Since that time, however, 
a number of events (culminating in the Supreme Court‘s Booker decision) have obviated the need for 
―fake‖ 5K1.1 letters. 
 167. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (1999–
2008). 
 168. Compare 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 159, at tbl.30, with 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 
1, at tbl.30. 
 169. See, e.g., supra note 167. 
 170. See infra Figure 2. Compare 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 159, at tbl.26, with 2008 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.26. 
 171. See infra Figure 2. 

















5K1.1 Motions as a Percentage of Defendants Sentenced  
Circuit 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004174 2005175 2006 2007 2008 
1 15.5 15.9 14.6 14.4 13.5 13.8/16.6 14.1/11.5 13.6 10.8 10.5 
2 23.1 23.9 21.7 19 17.5 19.2/23.0 24.4/21.4 21.2 21.6 21.9 
3 32.2 30.5 30.6 32.3 28.8 30.3/26.7 26.9/22.7 27.4 27.1 24.2 
4 22.7 20.9 20.2 18.6 18.3 16.7/16.8 18.7/18.4 17.3 16.8 17.6 
5 15.4 13.6 12.3 13.4 12.5 10.3/9.6 8.3/8.2 7.9 8.4 7.5 
6 25.6 24.4 27.2 26 24.6 24.3/22.6 24.2/25.0 25.4 25.2 25.7 
7 20.4 21.7 21.2 21.8 21.2 19.0/17.0 18.8/17.5 17.4 17.7 18.4 
8 26.0 23.1 22.0 18.9 17.6 15.3/14.0 16.2/14.4 15.9 14.7 15.1 
9 10.4 11.6 10.7 11.8 10.2 10.6/9.5 10.4/10.4 10.6 10.0 9.3 
10 12.8 10.9 11.0 11.0 9.4 10.3/10.8 10.5/9.8 8.7 9.1 6.9 
11 22.1 21.4 19.9 22.4 19.9 21.0/19.0 17.5/17.5 18.3 17.8 15.2 
DC 19.6 19.3 13.8 31.1 26.4 31.3/29.6 24.8/27.2 18.4 33.9 34.5 
 
One final point: the decline in the percentage of cooperators does not 
appear to be for want of criminals seeking that status. Otherwise, we 
would see an increase in cooperator discounts. That, however, has not 
occurred. Discounts either have remained flat (as with narcotics 
defendants) or have decreased (as with fraud offenders).
176
 
Notwithstanding significant changes in the law and procedure of federal 
sentencing, the government retains significant power to choose its 
cooperators. That being said, the news is not all good for the government. 
Despite its considerable power, the government still can find itself on the 
losing end of the deals it strikes with defendants. I explain how in the 
section below.  
 
 
 173. Figure 2 was compiled using data from 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at tbl.26 (1999–
2002, 2006–2008), tbl.26A (2003–2005). 
 174. The 2004 column has been broken into Pre- and Post-Blakely figures, as provided by Table 
26A in the 2004 Sourcebook. 
 175. The 2005 column into Pre- and Post-Booker figures, as provided by Table 26A in the 2005 
Sourcebook. 
 176. See supra notes 158–59. 












B. Three Factors that Increase the Sanction Effect 
The Sanction Effect comes about because the government‘s lenience at 
sentencing reduces the expected sentence for a given range of crimes. As I 
suggest later, in Part IV, the Sanction Effect should not necessarily bother 
us if it is relatively small or modest. When it overcomes the Detection 
Effect, however, the Sanction Effect threatens deterrence goals. 
Accordingly, we should be concerned about factors that cause the Sanction 
Effect to balloon in size. In this section, I theorize three factors that inflate 
the Sanction Effect. The first is ―excessive cooperation,‖ whereby the 
government signs up more cooperators than it can effectively use. The 
second, which is related, is ―excessive payment,‖ whereby the government 
pays the cooperator a greater discount than the cooperator‘s assistance 
actually warrants. The third is the cooperator‘s own over-optimism, which 
causes her to overestimate the discount she will receive if she cooperates.  
1. Excessive Cooperation  
Despite the fact that criminals have ample reason to compete for 
cooperation agreements (as discussed supra in Part II), prosecutors and 
law enforcement agents have their own incentives to sign up cooperators, 
which, in turn, may cause them to purchase more cooperation than they 
actually need.  
Assume both agents and prosecutors seek generally to maximize 
convictions and avoid embarrassing losses at trial. Agents may push 
prosecutors to sign up otherwise unreliable defendants as cooperators 
because the agents have professional interests in investigating and solving 
cooperation-intensive crimes. Job promotions, after all, often come from 
dismantling large criminal organizations and from amassing a long record 
of arrests and convictions.
177
 And when the cooperator‘s information in 
fact leads to this result, society too benefits from the government‘s 
agreement with the cooperator.  
However, in some instances, the cooperation agreement may lead to 
only a few arrests or the dismantling of a small group that would have 
disbanded or been apprehended anyway. In those situations, the law 
 
 
 177. ―[T]he Justice Department has become more attuned to ‗outputs,‘ pressing U.S. Attorneys for 
measurable results in terms of numbers of cases processed, either to trumpet the success of an 
administration crime initiative, or to demonstrate tangible results in crime types that have become the 
focus of congressional interest.‖ Frank O. Bowman, III, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and 













enforcement agent‘s interest diverges from society‘s interest. The agent 
prefers cooperation because it generates arrests and convictions and 
therefore improves her record. By contrast, society might prefer the agent 
to work on other investigations, particularly investigations of more 
intractable and dangerous criminal organizations. Individual law 
enforcement agents, however, are unlikely to perceive this divergence, and 
even if they do, they will likely ignore it so long as promotions and 
prestige are premised on the continuous churning of convictions and 
arrests. Supervisors are also likely to prefer cooperation, particularly if 
they are forced to show statistics to legislators who set budgets and 
allocate limited resources.
178
 Most importantly, it seems highly unlikely 
that ordinary citizens will be able to monitor these problems, since they, 
too, will be lulled by an agency‘s announcement of ―X arrests over the past 
Y months.‖  
Prosecutors also have strong incentives to enter into cooperation 
agreements, which may or may not diverge from society‘s interest. To the 
extent prosecutors have reason to maximize convictions and avoid 
embarrassing losses (and, in fewer instances, cement high-profile wins), 
cooperation serves both of these ends.
179
 Moreover, cooperation serves the 
prosecutor‘s interest in avoiding needless procedural litigation. Consider a 
defendant who is the subject of a search whose constitutionality is 
questionable. Except in those rare cases in which the search promises to 
make new law in the government‘s favor, the benefits of proceeding with a 
suppression hearing are minimal. At best, the trial court will find the 
search constitutional and the defendant subsequently will plead guilty. 
Even so, his guilty plea will be preceded by a time-consuming hearing, a 
delay in closing his case, lengthy witness preparation for the officers, and 
fewer opportunities to investigate and prosecute more serious crimes.  
By contrast, if the defendant becomes a cooperator, the legal 
implications of the cooperator‘s investigation largely disappear. The 
defendant immediately begins ―working‖ with the law enforcement agents 
by contacting associates, setting up meetings, and taking direction from 
his new ―supervisors.‖ Instead of investing energy and time justifying a 
prior arrest, law enforcement agents and prosecutors instead get the benefit 
 
 
 178. For an interesting discussion of how data-driven approaches can distort criminal justice 
institutions and policies, see Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril amid the 
Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 1 (2007). See also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. 
Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 184–85 (2008) (explaining how increasingly cheaper 
access to technology fuels increase in data-driven law enforcement strategies). 
 179. See Simons, supra note 62, at 932–33 (observing perception that offices that prosecute more 
defendants are rewarded with greater resources).  












of a conviction (since the cooperator‘s guilty plea counts as one), as well 
as the expectation of future arrests and possibly more dangerous (and 
therefore more newsworthy) criminals. Through cooperation, a 
questionable arrest metamorphoses from a potential cost center, whereby 
the prosecutor and agents must waste time justifying a prior arrest, to an 
attractive income stream, whereby the prosecutor and agents can generate 
future convictions.  
Behavioral economics further suggests that both prosecutors and agents 
should lean strongly toward cooperation. For example, an empirical study 
by Ehud Guttel and Alon Harel suggests that individuals may be more 
willing to predict a future event than to guess the results (―postdict‖) of a 
past event.
180
 Under this framework, prosecutors, defendants, and defense 
counsel all might prefer cooperation to a trial or evidentiary hearing. 
Hearings and trials trigger postdictive questions about the strength of 
evidence already collected. Cooperation, by contrast, encourages the 
interested parties to indulge in predictive estimations, such as the future 
value of the cooperator‘s assistance on one hand and the potential size of 
the cooperator‘s discount on the other.
181
 
Cooperation also appeals to prosecutors‘ risk aversion. If, as Stephanos 
Bibas has observed, prosecutors are both risk averse and loss averse, they 
should prefer the certainty of convictions over the uncertainty of possible 
trial losses.
182
 No prosecutor will lose her job or reputation for signing up 
an extra defendant to testify against a drug kingpin.
183
 Losing the case 
against the kingpin, however, is far more embarrassing, particularly in a 





 180. Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal Postdiction, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 467 (2008). 
 181. Cooperation also may result in what is known as ―fundamental attribution bias,‖ whereby 
prosecutors might ―put too much weight‖ in their analysis of the cooperator‘s perceived ―character 
traits‖ in predicting the cooperator‘s future usefulness, while ―ignoring the often more important 
influence of the situation on behavior.‖ Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral 
Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 84. 
 182. Bibas, supra note 20, at 2471 (contending that risk aversion causes prosecutors to prefer plea 
bargains over maximal sentences). 
 183. During the last year, federal prosecutors in New York have already signed up nine 
cooperators in the investigation and prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam and his hedge fund, Galleon 
Group, for insider trading. Although the cooperators are reportedly assisting in additional 
investigations, the government‘s heightened risk aversion may also explain the large number of 
cooperators. See Amir Efrati, Hello Franz! Cooperator No. 9 in Galleon Case Makes Debut, WALL ST. 
J. L. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 10:02 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/03/10/hello-franz-cooperator-
no-9-in-galleon-case-makes-debut/.  
 184. Moreover, as the number of trials decreases, prosecutors become less adept at determining 













Finally, whereas cooperation‘s benefits will be quite obvious to the 
prosecutor and her law enforcement agents, its costs are more abstract and 
therefore easier to ignore. Because they accrue in the aggregate and over a 
relatively long period of time, the costs of excessive cooperation are not 
likely to affect or be evident to individual government actors. These costs 
are also likely to be ignored because they need not be paid up front. The 
prosecutor does not pay the defendant when she signs the cooperation 
agreement. Indeed, since the discount is set by the defendant‘s sentencing 
judge, the prosecutor technically does not pay the defendant anything. 
Thus, cooperators can claim truthfully, when testifying at trial that, so far 
as they know, the prosecutor lacks the power to set their sentence.
185
  
This is, of course, a convenient fiction. Judges do not sanction in a 
vacuum, and the 5K1.1 ―substantial assistance‖ letters that prosecutors 
write and file with the court are not mere formalities. The content of the 
prosecutor‘s letter clearly can influence the sentencing court‘s degree of 
discount. Accordingly, although they do so indirectly, prosecutors do in 
fact ―pay‖ for cooperation. Nevertheless, the indirect means of payment 
combined with the time delay in imposing the sentence create a recipe 
whereby prosecutors are more likely to ignore or downplay the costs of 
cooperation agreements. As a result, they will use less restraint when they 
decide whether to enter into such agreements in the first place.
186
  
2. Excessive Discounts 
The foregoing section suggests that legal actors have individual, 
institutional, and behavioral incentives to enter into too many cooperation 
 
 
at 237 (arguing that as number of trials decreases, ―the attention each trial receives within the 
[prosecutor‘s] office increases, as does the potential professional risk to any lawyer involved‖).  
 185. Jeffries and Gleeson note the paradox that ―[w]hile federal law conditions leniency on 
prosecutorial initiative, it allows the prosecutor to delegate to the court the task of determining the 
degree of leniency. The distinction is critical to the credibility of the accomplice witnesses on whom 
most organized crime prosecutions depend.‖ Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 9, at 1121–22. See also R. 
Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied 
Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2004) (explaining that prosecutors purposely leave 
cooperator‘s promised discount ―vague and open-ended‖ to preserve cooperator‘s credibility as 
testifying witness). 
 186. One might argue that over time, repeat players should learn from their mistakes. However, 
even repeat players may fail to grasp the system-wide costs imposed by excessive cooperation. 
Morover, in some of the most popular prosecutors‘ offices, however, the turnover rate can be quite 
high. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys To Reduce Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1093–94 (2009); see also Daniel Richman, Institutional 
Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2069 n.81 (2006) (citing studies 
indicating that, despite growing careerism in some prosecutor‘s offices, ―[o]ffices in the largest 
metropolitan areas‖ run counter to that trend).  












agreements. Law enforcement actors also may increase the Sanction Effect 
by overcompensating cooperators for their service. As I suggest in this 
section, these two factors may be linked. 
Any number of factors may produce ―overpayment‖ in some, but not 
all, cases. The Guidelines provide no insights on how judges should 
calculate discounts, and judges likely prefer different sentencing 
philosophies.
187
 Nevertheless, one should expect judges to sentence 
cooperators relative to some baseline, assuming that is how they sentence 
defendants generally.
188
 Discounts will differ depending on whether a 
judge sentences by comparing a given cooperator to other cooperators that 
he has sentenced recently, or by comparing the cooperator to the 
noncooperating defendants in the case. Finally, discounts may differ 
depending on whether the court believes any defendant (much less a 
cooperator) deserves the prescribed baseline sentence.  
All of the above factors introduce noise into cooperator sentencing. But 
it is not clear that these factors, by themselves, would create a systematic 
bias in favor of overpayment. Presumably, some factors—how the 
cooperator compares with the noncooperating defendant, or how heavily a 
judge leans on potentially meaningless numerical data—could cancel each 
other out. One cooperator‘s stingy discount theoretically could be matched 
by another‘s comparative windfall.
189
  
That being said, there may be some instances in which legal actors 
systematically overpay cooperators. For example, prosecutors may 
(somewhat surprisingly) trend toward overpayment. If government 
prosecutors sign up one hundred cooperators, but only eighty were truly 
necessary to increase the rate of conviction and detection, government 
prosecutors nevertheless may convince themselves that all one hundred 
were necessary. Prosecutors‘ offices will do this for several reasons: (a) a 
valuation of the cooperator is in essence a valuation of the prosecutor‘s 
prior decision to hire or purchase the cooperator‘s services;
190
 (b) over 
 
 
 187. See Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics at 
Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1377 n.24 (2009) (citing studies addressing judges‘ 
philosophies).  
 188. See Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 555–56 (2001) 
(asserting that sentencing is ―intrinsically a relative [question]‖ for which the answer should ―be 
worked out by reference to what punishment is . . . imposed on a range of other offenders‖).  
 189. Compare United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 142, 152 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming trial 
court‘s one-month downward departure for defendant who assisted the government over five-year 
period and contributed to thirty convictions), with United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033–34 
(8th Cir. 2005) (reversing departure that appeared excessive compared to assistance provided). 
 190. For similar observations of cognitive dissonance in the corporate context, see Langevoort, 













time, the government and its agents come to sympathize with the 
cooperator, particularly in instances of prolonged contact between 
government agents and cooperating defendants; and (c) prosecutors feel a 
greater need to maintain cooperation‘s attractiveness as a policy to 
defendants than they do to rein in the overall costs of cooperation.
191
  
If prosecutors trend toward overpayment, judges too may trend toward 
overpayment, albeit for different reasons. First, the inclusion of 
suboptimal cooperators in the cooperator pool may cause judges to 
―overpay‖ all of the cooperating defendants. If the typical judge applies a 
modest sentence discount (30%) for cooperators whose assistance meets 
the government‘s minimal definition of substantial assistance, the 30% 
discount may be the floor from which the judge builds increasingly 
generous discounts. She may apply a more generous discount (50%) for 
good cooperators and a highly generous discount (80%) for outstanding 
cooperators.  
Assuming judges sentence cooperators relative to each other, the 
government‘s inclusion of minimally helpful cooperators in the court‘s 
―cooperating pool‖ leads judges to excessively remunerate the entire pool. 
Even worse, this form of ―cooperator creep‖ may create reciprocal effects 
between judges on one hand, and prosecutors and cooperators on the other. 
That is, over time, prosecutors may demand, and potential cooperators 
may offer, less useful information and assistance. 
A further source of overpayment might be the government‘s 
publication annually of mean cooperator discounts. If cooperators are 
aware of the mean discount, then in many instances they (and their 
attorneys) should rationally seek discounts greater than the mean. (A 
caveat: this may not be true of defense attorneys who are repeat players in 
small districts and therefore interested in preserving their long-term 
credibility before judges.) Unless the mean discount translates into no term 
of imprisonment, all criminal cooperators should argue that they have 
delivered better than average value.  
This might not be cause for concern if the government matches the 
defense with its own pressure for stingier discounts. Yet, as discussed 
infra, institutional and behavioral factors may cause prosecutors to decline 
to counteract the defendants‘ collective push for ever generous discounts. 
 
 
in ways that bolster their prior commitments.‖).  
 191. In contrast, Cynthia Lee, see supra note 22, at 219–20, worries that prosecutors may deny 
substantial assistance motions arbitrarily, particularly in light of the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Wade 
v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 (1992) (holding that prosecutor‘s failure to file substantial 
assistance motion is unreviewable unless defendant alleges unconstitutional motive).  












That is, fundamental attribution error, sympathy and personal bias, and a 
desire to maintain cooperation‘s overall attractiveness as a system 
(particularly if the prosecutor is in the midst of negotiating new 
cooperation agreements at the time of sentencing), all could restrain 
prosecutors from seeking discounts below the mean.  
Presumably, if ―escalating pay‖ were a problem in cooperator circles, 
we might expect to see discounts follow a continuous upward trajectory. 
Happily, that is not the case. As indicated by Figure 3 below, the national 
discount rate for narcotics, fraud, and robbery offenses either has remained 
flat or has decreased in recent years.  
FIGURE 3—COOPERATOR DISCOUNTS (MEDIAN PERCENT DECREASE 
FROM MINIMUM GUIDELINE SENTENCE)
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Offense 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Drugs—
Trafficking 48.5 47.8 48.1 46.7 45.2 44.7 45.8 43.5 42.6 44.4 
Fraud 100.0 99.7 99.6 99.8 99.9 94.3 97.8 80.0 80.0 70.3 
Robbery 33.3 34.5 34.1 35.1 33.3 29.1 35.6 34.6 31.2 33.3 
TOTAL 50.0 50.3 50.0 50.0 49.9 48.9 50.0 47.8 47.4 47.8 
 
The discount rate, however, says nothing about the value of assistance 
that the government has received in exchange. Defendants could 
potentially be providing better information and assistance for the same or 
decreased discount, or they could be providing gradually less valuable 
information and assistance. Without additional information on the type 
and amount of assistance that prosecutors receive, our data on cooperation 
is profoundly incomplete.  
In sum, there remains the possibility that courts will overpay 
cooperating defendants. Do prosecutors and courts take steps to guard 
against it? There does not appear to be any mechanism in place to test for 
overpayment. Presumably, some judges keep track of the scope and degree 
of their own cooperator discounts. Similarly, some United States 
Attorneys‘ Offices may implement office-wide suggestions on how much 
of a discount a given type of assistance merits.
193
 But on the whole, there 
 
 
 192. Figure 3 was compiled using data from the ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 160, at tbl.30 
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 193. For references to such practices, see Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet 
Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 













exists no mechanism by which a court or prosecutor can reliably value a 
defendant‘s assistance.  
3. Excessive Optimism 
In a 1998 study, researchers found that nearly twice as many 
defendants attempted to cooperate with the government than actually 
received substantial assistance departures.
194
 The same study cited a 1996 
survey of federal judges, which indicated that, of those judges queried, 
59% had had at least one case in which they believe the defendant should 
have received a substantial assistance departure, although the same study 




Despite the jurists‘ follow-up contention that wrongful denials were 
infrequent, critics of cooperation might well argue that, based on the two 
sets of statistics cited above, one can condlude prosecutors were overly 
stingy in the 1990s in handing out 5K1.1 letters. 
On the other hand, claimed incidences of ―wrongful‖ denials may also 
demonstrate that defendants maintain unrealistic expectations regarding 
their ability to secure cooperation agreements. These unrealistic 
expectations, in turn, may further inflate cooperation‘s Sanction Effect.  
As John Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson explained back in 1995, 
prosecutors select cooperators on a number of factors, including ―the 
degree of credibility-damaging baggage [a defendant] would bring to the 
witness stand.‖
196
 By design, prosecutors possess far more information 
about their choices of cooperators than do criminal defendants. As a result, 
it would not be surprising if defendants were overly optimistic about their 
chances of being chosen as a cooperator. Indeed, skilled prosecutors might 
attempt to nurture this optimism, since it would result in additional 
proffers and additional flows of information.
197
 The problem, of course, is 
that the very optimism that causes an offender to give up information in 
search of a cooperation agreement may also cause her to discount the 
sentence that she would receive if caught.  
Finally, excess cooperation and overoptimism create perversely 
effective synergies. In some circuits, as many as one in four defendants 
 
 
 194. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 18, at 10, cited in Cynthia Lee & Brian Derdowski, Jr., 
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 195. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 18, at 15.  
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 Since some defendants presumably did not seek 
cooperation agreements, the percentage of defendants that the government 
is selecting from the cooperation pool is even higher. A relatively high 
percentage of cooperation renders overoptimism a more serious problem. 
If a prosecutor‘s office offers cooperation agreements to one in three 
defendants, it would not be surprising if most of the offenders in that 
district assumed that they would be the ―one.‖  
Moreover, criminals also may overestimate the potential discount they 
will receive in exchange for cooperation. One court has observed that 
cooperating defendants often expect sentences of no incarceration, despite 
their underlying crimes.
199
 Although the source of such expectations is 
difficult to track, the media‘s discussion of infamous cooperators may 
contribute. When the government finally convicted John Gotti, the 
infamous boss of the Gambino family, for racketeering offenses, the press 
widely reported not only Gotti‘s sentence (life imprisonment) but also the 
five-year sentence the district court judge imposed on the government‘s 
star cooperator, Sammy ―the Bull‖ Gravano, despite Gravano‘s admissions 
that he had committed nineteen murders while a member of the mob.
200
 
Gravano‘s discount was widely reported and criticized in the popular 




In more recent times, white collar cooperators have received substantial 
and widely reported discounts for their help, resulting in minimal or 
sometimes nonexistent sentences of imprisonment.
202
 Scott Sullivan, 
Worldcom‘s former CFO, was arguably the architect of the accounting 
 
 
 198. See supra Figure 2. The D.C. and Sixth Circuits cooperated with over a quarter of their 
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 199. United States v. Losovsky, 571 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
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 201. See Marzulli, supra note 200 (reporting that after serving a five-year sentence, Gravano 
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 202. Laura Smitherman, Sullivan Given 5-Year Term in WorldCom Case, BALT. SUN, Aug. 12, 
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story. For examples of reports of cooperation discounts in the street crime context, see Jim 
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May 31, 2009, at M5, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/31/drug-dealer-
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fraud the company perpetrated on its shareholders.
203
 Nevertheless, 
because he cooperated against Bernard Ebbers, Worldcom‘s CEO, 
Sullivan received a prison sentence of just five years, while Ebbers 
received a sentence five times as long.
204
 One newspaper report cited legal 
experts for the conclusion that Ebbers‘s double-digit sentence ―sends a 
message to Corporate America to clean up its act,‖ while Sullivan‘s 




Thus the media‘s coverage of particularly light cooperator sentences 
may increase cooperation‘s perceived value to potential criminals. In some 
instances, perceptions may well outweigh reality. According to the 2008 
Bureau of Sentencing Statistics, the median discount for cooperating 
narcotics defendants was roughly 40% less than the minimum Guidelines 
recommended sentence.
206
 Although this represents a substantial 
reduction, it leaves many cooperators with substantial jail sentences. 
Potential criminals may perceive a far higher discount, however, because 
of the media‘s focus on celebrated cases of cooperation.  
The media‘s reporting of cooperator discounts also creates important 
implications for cooperation‘s reputation costs.
207
 Ordinarily, the 
defendant considering cooperation must also weigh the costs of his 
community‘s hatred.
208
 Despite what has been called an anti-snitching 
norm in popular culture,
209
 cooperation nevertheless has flourished in the 
federal criminal justice system.
210
 Part of this may be due to the fact that 
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federal offenders often face substantial, if not mandatory, sentences of 
imprisonment. Communal hatred may pale when compared with near-
certain ten-year prison sentences with no possibility of parole.  
Ironically, widespread reporting of cooperation and cooperator 
discounts may reduce the reputation costs of cooperation.
211
 Sara Sun 
Beale has discussed the manner by which the media‘s portrayal of crime 
influences popular attitudes about criminal punishment.
212
 Similarly, the 
media‘s portrayal of criminal cooperators can shape popular attitudes 
about criminal cooperation and criminal sentences. For example, 
widespread reporting of cooperation can reduce the intensity of anti-
snitching norms by demonstrating cooperation‘s popularity among 
defendants. Regardless of inner-city initiatives to ―stop snitching‖ among 
offenders, cooperation cannot be so bad if everyone does it.
213
  
Critics might argue that the media‘s coverage of criminal sentences 
cuts both ways. After all, the press does not report solely the cooperator‘s 
sentence; it also reports, usually with great fanfare, the noncooperator‘s 
conviction and substantial sentence. Accordingly, one might argue that 
media‘s coverage sends dual messages that neutralize each other.
214
  
The problem with this ―wash-out‖ analysis is that the potential criminal 
may not weigh both outcomes equally. As noted before, we tend to be 
overly optimistic individuals; we assume we have a greater ability to 
control future events than is actually the case. Criminals may be 
particularly prone to overoptimism.
215
 Accordingly, a corporate executive 
contemplating accounting fraud may focus her attention on the ―good 
news‖ portion of a given account of a criminal prosecution (Scott 
Sullivan‘s discount for cooperating in the Worldcom prosecution, for 
example), and ignore the ―bad news‖ portion of that same report (such as 
Bernard Ebbers‘s twenty-five-year sentence of imprisonment for 
spearheading the Worldcom accounting fraud).  
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IV. THE SANCTION AND DETECTION EFFECTS COMBINED  
Cooperation creates both Sanction and Detection Effects, which place 
competing strains on the government‘s attempt to deter crime by altering 
the defendant‘s ex ante expected costs of conduct. The Detection Effect 
increases the defendant‘s perceived probability of getting caught, whereas 
the Sanction Effect decreases his expected sanction if he is in fact caught. 
What matters most, however, is his expected punishment, which in turn 
relies on how the two effects interact.  
The first section of this Part considers the three basic permutations for 
Sanction and Detection Effects. The first is that the Detection Effect 
outweighs the Sanction Effect. The second is that the two cancel each 
other out, which still results in a loss to society since cooperation is itself a 
costly policy, whose administrative costs I discuss at some length below. 
Finally, the worst case scenario is that the Sanction Effect overcomes the 
Detection Effect, in which case society pays for a policy that creates more 
crime.  
Having considered these three scenarios, I then explore the two types 
of responses a government might take in the event it discerns an imbalance 
in Sanction and Detection Effects. One set of responses would attempt to 
cure the problem by tinkering with the cooperation process itself. Thus, 
the government might purposely reduce the number of cooperation 
agreements it offers or reduce the discounts it provides for ―substantial 
assistance.‖ The coordination problems that created the imbalance in the 
first place, however, may not be so easy to solve. 
The alternate means of responding to Detection/Sanction Effect 
imbalances is to change other aspects of law enforcement, such as 
increasing law enforcement efforts overall or increasing the baseline 
sanction for given offenses. Unfortunately, this strategy, too, creates 
additional problems, which I explore below.  
A. Measuring the Interaction of Detection and Sanction Effects 
This section first considers how psychological factors may or may not 
elevate changes in detection over changes in sanctions. The remainder of 
the section considers three permutations for Detection and Sanction 
Effects.  
1. The Presumed Magnitude of Detection 
If criminals viewed detection and sanction probabilities equally, one 
could measure cooperation‘s overall effect on deterrence by measuring the 












Detection Effect against the Sanction Effect directly. Such comparisons, 
however, are greatly hampered by the fact that criminals reportedly do pay 
more attention to the probability of punishment than they do to the 
severity of punishment.
216
 Accordingly, one cannot measure the two 
effects simply by comparing the two deltas (change in probability of 
detection and change in sanction) on a one-to-one basis. Instead, the 
Detection Effect arguably gets the benefit of some unknown multiplier.  
I say ―arguably‖ because although detection probability matters more 
to defendants than a small or even moderate reduction in sanctions, 
detection‘s advantage may evaporate when the perceived sentence is one 
of no incarceration. A sentence of no incarceration carries none of the 
stigma nor the restrictions on liberty that even a six-month jail term 
carries. A cooperation agreement that eliminates prison time altogether 
alters the social meaning of the sanction.
217




For that very reason, we should be concerned that the Sanction Effect 
is perceived by criminal defendants not as a moderate reduction in 
sanctions (in which case the Detection Effect will often dwarf it), but 
rather as a means of reducing the possibility of any real punishment, in 
which case the two competing effects will be judged equally.  
Whether potential wrongdoers are justified in assuming a ―zero 
sanction‖ is beside the point. If criminal offenders perceive the discount to 
be so generous as to take the sanction to zero, then it might as well be 
zero. Even more importantly, if sanctions are perceived as zero, criminals 
may perceive the Sanction Effect as simply another way of avoiding 
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getting caught. In other words, when the expected sanction is zero, 
criminals may equate the Sanction Effect with the Detection Effect.  
In sum, even if we presume that defendants value the probability of 
detection more than they value moderate decreases in sanctions, we would 
be foolish to ignore the Sanction Effect.  
2. Three Possibilities 
Detection and Sanction Effects can interact in three ways. The 
Detection Effect may exceed the Sanction Effect, causing the expected 
cost of punishment to increase; the two Effects may cancel each other out, 
in which case the criminal‘s expected cost stays the same; and the 
Sanction Effect may exceed the Detection Effect, causing the criminal‘s 
expected cost to decrease. 
Even if prosecutors overpay some defendants, the net Detection Effect 
may well exceed the Sanction Effect, particularly if other defendants are 
underpaid (or unpaid) for their assistance.
219
 The government benefits not 
just from the defendants who cooperate, but from the overall incentive to 
cooperate, which allows the government to secure other benefits from 
defendants without having to pay them.
220
  
If cooperation‘s aggregate Detection Effect exceeds its Sanction Effect, 
then the expected cost of criminal conduct increases and the policy deters 
some crimes. This is not the end of the inquiry, however, because the 
avoided harm must be measured against the costs of implementing the 
policy.
221
 Cooperation involves a number of administrative and transaction 
costs that, depending on the harms avoided, may or may not outweigh its 
marginal improvement in deterrence. In other words, even when the 
Detection Effect exceeds the Sanction Effect, cooperation still may be far 
more costly to administer than it is worth. 
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Cooperation creates both transactional and administrative costs. Prior 
to entering an agreement, the government must arrange multiple proffer 
sessions, which create administrative headaches insofar as the defendant is 
incarcerated or speaks another language.
222
 Moreover, negotiating and 
interpreting cooperation agreements, however much boilerplate they may 
contain, also costs time and money.
223
  
More troubling are the costs that accrue after the cooperator has signed 
her agreement and entered her guilty plea. First, the government must 
protect the cooperator from other criminals or members of society who 
would harm the cooperator, either out of spite or a desire to avoid 
detection.
224
 These protection costs may increase as technology improves 




In addition, like any other principal who contracts with an agent, the 
government must monitor the cooperator to make sure she is following 
orders. These agency costs of cooperation can be quite significant. Having 
already broken the law, cooperators are not exactly the most trustworthy 
agents. They have incentives and opportunities to shirk their 
responsibilities, either by declining to report on other criminals (especially 
if the criminals are friends or family), by continuing to engage in criminal 
activity, or by hiding the proceeds of their prior criminal activity.
226
 As 
noted earlier in Part II, to prevent the harms created by these agency costs, 
the government therefore must expend substantial resources to monitor 
cooperators.  
When prosecutors know in advance that agency costs are likely to be 
high, prosecutors might choose their cooperators more carefully, pay 
cooperators a lower premium to reflect higher agency costs, or limit 
cooperation to those cases in which the underlying crime is particularly 
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serious, harmful, or difficult to combat without cooperation. Accordingly, 
agency costs may provide a partial explanation for the substantial 
differences between the discounts that cooperators receive in narcotics 
cases (40%) and the discounts they receive in fraud cases (70-100%).
227
  
If administrative costs are anything above zero, then the second 
permutation, whereby the Detection and Sanction Effects equal each other, 
is surely a negative proposition for society. If deterrence stays exactly the 
same, cooperation is nothing more than a highly inefficient transfer of 
wealth from taxpayers to the ―entrepreneurs‖ who benefit from 
cooperation: defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and the law 
enforcement agencies that are paid to use and protect cooperators.  
The final permutation is the worst one, that the Sanction Effect 
outweighs the Detection Effect. Recall: the Sanction Effect reduces the 
defendant‘s weighted sanction, while the Detection Effect increases her 
probability of being apprehended and punished. If the Sanction Effect 
outweighs the Detection Effect, deterrence is reduced. The incidence of 
crime increases because, despite the increased likelihood of getting caught, 
criminals presume that they will be able to reduce their sanctions 
substantially by cooperating with the government. Since cooperation is 
itself costly, society effectively pays for more crime.  
B. Reducing the Sanction Effect: A Difficult Endeavor 
Assume for a moment that society could easily measure cooperation‘s 
Detection and Sanction Effects, and it determined that the Sanction Effect 
outweighed the Detection Effect, at least in some contexts. How could the 
government remedy the imbalance without eliminating all or some of 
cooperation‘s benefits?  
One approach might be to tinker with the cooperation process itself. 
For example, prosecutors might cooperate with fewer defendants.
228
 They 
might also ask sentencing courts to reduce cooperator discounts, or 
withdraw more quickly from agreements when cooperators provide 
insufficient information or violate the terms of the agreement. All of these 
activities would introduce more uncertainty into the cooperation process 
and therefore reduce the Sanction Effect.  
 
 
 227. The different discounts reflect additional factors, such as the supply of potential cooperators 
relative to those willing to take a straight guilty plea or go to trial.  
 228. Weinstein suggested as much in his 1999 article, see Weinstein supra note 2, at 614–15, but 
he was concerned primarily with disparity‘s unjust implications for defendants and not with 
maximizing cooperation‘s enforcement value.  












Unfortunately, if the supply of cooperators is elastic—in other words, if 
defendants have viable alternate means of achieving reductions in their 
sentences—the introduction of such uncertainty will affect the Detection 
Effect negatively. Some defendants will no longer attempt to become 
cooperators and proffer sessions will decrease. Moreover, defendants who 
are already cooperators will feel less pressure to maximize their 
cooperation. Accordingly, when substitutes are available, the 
government‘s attempts to reduce the Sanction Effect may also reduce the 
Detection Effect. In other words, if we reduce cooperation‘s benefits, we 
might find ourselves with fewer and less helpful cooperators. 
Five years ago, one might plausibly have stated that there were no such 
substitutes and that the government therefore could cut cooperator benefits 
with little worry of damaging its supply of potential cooperators.
229
 Post-
Booker, the story has changed.
230
 The Sentencing Guidelines are no longer 
mandatory. Where mandatory statutory minimums are not present, judges 
have far more latitude to sentence defendants below the recommended 
Guideline range of imprisonment. In such an environment, the government 
may well be reluctant to test the elasticity of cooperator demand. 
More importantly, even if the demand for cooperation is inelastic, 
coordination problems will likely interfere with any sustained attempt to 
reduce the Sanction Effect. Even when cooperator ―demand‖ is high in the 
aggregate, prosecutors and individual law enforcement agents still may 
worry that their cases will suffer should they cut back on the number of 
cooperators or take measures to reduce cooperator discounts. Larger sub-
units to which prosecutors and agents belong—such as an individual 
United States Attorney‘s Office or FBI unit—will be similarly reluctant to 
reduce cooperation if those reductions impact all-important conviction and 
arrest statistics, which are the source of resources and prestige.  
Accordingly, the best solution might be a centralized one, whereby the 
Department of Justice limits either the number or value of benefits 
extended to cooperators by its United States Attorneys‘ Offices.
231
 Such 
intervention, however, would be a break from the DOJ‘s current hands-off 
stance. True, the DOJ has directed its prosecutors to plea bargain 
―honestly‖ and to file charges that ―reflect the totality and seriousness of 
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 It also has directed prosecutors to seek 
approval from supervisors prior to filing substantial assistance motions on 
behalf of a criminal defendant.
233
 Beyond these bromides, however, the 
DOJ traditionally has exercised little control over the manner by which 
individual United States Attorneys‘ Offices implement cooperation. 
Absent strong empirical evidence of an excessive Sanction Effect, it seems 
unlikely that DOJ officials will extensively review (much less intervene 
in) local prosecutorial decision making about cooperation.  
If the government is disinclined to remedy the Sanction/Detection 
Effect imbalance by altering its own stance on cooperation, it can instead 
seek redress outside the cooperation system. That is, it can push for more 
enforcement resources, higher sanctions, or for an increase in the number 
and scope of substantive laws that define certain types of behavior.
234
 The 
perverse implications of this spiral should now be clear: when government 
actors cause the Sanction Effect to exceed the Detection Effect, they have 
a choice. They can fix the problem from within, and suffer the various 
transactional and political costs that might accrue when a centralized 
political body intervenes in the (previously) discretionary decision making 
of its local offices and prosecutors. Or, those same actors can lobby for 
more resources and harsher baseline criminal sanctions. They can then 
dole out to the local officers and prosecutors more money and harsher 
laws and sentences. One does not have to be a strong adherent of public 
choice theory to recognize that in most instances, the DOJ will likely 
choose the latter over the former. 
Critics will argue that the doomsday scenario described above is 
largely hypothetical. We do not know if the Sanction Effect exceeds the 
Detection Effect because the government has made no (public) effort to 
measure or compare either of the two effects. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to note that over the last two decades, the minimum statutory and 
Sentencing Guidelines ranges for a number of federal offenses, including 
mail and wire fraud, have increased.
235
  
It may well be that these increases have nothing to do with the 
deterrent value of cooperation, but instead reflect a preference ―to err on 
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the side of harshness.‖
236
 But another rather disquieting explanation for 
such laws is the one we never consider: that they result from our 
overreliance on cooperation as a law enforcement technique. If this 
suggestion is correct, then cooperation‘s greatest cost may be the funds 
that society spends to correct imbalances that legislators fail to perceive 
and that law enforcement actors have little incentive to avoid.  
CONCLUSION 
Cooperation is a complex system that creates two important and 
competing effects on the cost-benefit analyses of potential wrongdoers. 
When one of those effects, the Sanction Effect, exceeds or equals the 
other, the Detection Effect, the policy fails to deter. Even when the 
Detection Effect outweighs the Sanction Effect, cooperation may be more 
costly than we assume.  
Currently, we do not know whether or when the Sanction Effect 
outweighs the Detection Effect. What we do know, however, is that if the 
Sanction Effect becomes too robust, it can create great problems for 
deterrence, and these problems may be difficult to correct. For all those 
reasons, we should take a closer look at our use of cooperation. To that 
end, several lines of inquiry come to mind:  
First, to better understand the Sanction Effect‘s potential scope, 
behavioral researchers should test how potential criminals perceive the 
possibility of cooperation. Are defendants overly optimistic about either 
their ability to cooperate or the degree of their expected sentencing 
discount? Does the Sanction Effect—particularly the notion that the 
sanction will be reduced to ―zero‖—in fact ―spill over‖ into the 
defendant‘s perceived probability of detection?  
Because the Sanction Effect is also a story about bureaucratic slack, 
researchers must focus their attention on prosecutors and law enforcement 
agents. A thorough, timely, and transparent review and comparison of the 
cooperation-based policies that are used throughout United States 
Attorneys‘ Offices would go a long way toward identifying the policies 
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analysis would cast further light on the recurrent debate over how much 
disparity we should tolerate in federal prosecution policies across the 
nation.
238
 Whatever the general arguments for prosecutorial discretion, 
cooperation‘s pathologies suggest the need for intervention by a more 
distant, centralized authority such as the DOJ.
239
 
Finally, the foregoing analysis should at least serve as a warning for 
regulators eager to adopt and expand cooperation-type policies. Trading 
leniency for information is neither costless nor guaranteed to reduce 
wrongdoing. Although no one would reasonably suggest the wholesale 
abandonment of this tool, regulators would be equally foolish to ignore 
cooperation‘s competing effects on the cost-benefit calculations of 
putative offenders. It may be impossible to eliminate cooperation‘s 
pathologies without imposing additional and undesirable costs. All the 
more reason, then, for regulators to look before they leap. To do any less is 
to leave themselves—and the public they serve—vulnerable to 
cooperation‘s greatest cost. 
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